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Transnational gangs pose the most serious threat to peace in Central America since the region’s civil wars in the 1990s. Short-sighted law enforcement strategies and recent efforts to involve the Central American militaries treat the violence as a one-dimensional security concern, while ignoring the socio-economic underpinnings of the conflict. Roots and manifestations There is no agreement as to the precise origins or motivations of the gangs. Although there are numerous copycat or splinter youth gangs, the main components are divided into two rival gangs (or “maras”), Barrio 18 (also known as 18th Street gang) and Mara Salvatrucha (also known as MS-13). The majority of the members are male in their teens or early 20s. They sustain themselves by organized crime networks of smuggling in drugs and persons and extortion. They are notorious for their unusual violence (including beheadings and mutilation), kidnappings, violence against women and their increasing pervasiveness, both geographically and numerically. Reports estimate there are 70,000 to 100,000 members from as far south as Honduras, spreading north to Mexico and in increasing numbers on both coasts of the United States. In the United States, the police departments in Los Angeles have been dealing with the violence for over two decades, but now there is a growing concern in Washington, D.C. and other U.S. cities. In the capital cities and other main urban centers (as well as in the peripheries) of Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador and Mexico, and along the U.S.-Mexico border, gang activity, especially homicide and drug trafficking, has reached alarming rates. Some experts have attributed this proliferation to the United States’ increased focus on the Middle East in recent years, which has caused decreased attention and funding for the issue.1 Others point to ineffective and misguided law-enforcement policies used to combat the networks on the part of all governments involved. Assessment and long-term policy design Transnational gangs are increasingly figuring prominently on the agendas of aid agencies, Community-Based Organizations (CBOs), Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and inter-governmental organizations, such as the Inter-American Development Bank, the Organization of American States and the Pan-American Health Organization, making the issue a subject of discussion and analysis for many consortiums and committees that are targeting development aid to combat gang violence. Short-term law enforcement response The principal policy response of the U.S. government (Department of Homeland Security and Federal Bureau of Investigation) has been either incarceration or deportation. In the case of incarceration, gang members are rarely offered a chance for rehabilitation or the opportunity to be part of a witness protection plan in exchange for information to combat the networks. Instead, they are placed in over-crowded prisons to carry out sentences among other gang members of the same or rival gangs. The consequence is increased prison violence and an opportunity to refine skills and strengthen networks while in close proximity. Although incarceration is considered punishment by U.S. law enforcement, experts report that it has manifested into “finishing school” for gang members. However, the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement estimates that 70 per cent of gang members who are picked up by the police - Los Angeles and Washington, D.C. have the highest concentration of members - are deported; the members are found in the United States without documentation and broadly linked to gang activity, yet sufficient evidence is lacking to prosecute them of a specific crime. The U.S. government therefore deports suspected gang members on a regular basis, flying weekly private jets of deportees and releasing them in their country of origin.3 Deportation only further perpetuates the phenomenon and its cycle has been referred to as a “revolving door,” “merry-go-round” and “unending chain.” Deportees are returned to their countries of origin stigmatized and with little assistance for integration and employment; many are not fluent in Spanish. They are, however, highly trained in sophisticated organized crime techniques and with the large number of other deportees and continual communication with members remaining in the United States, can recreate or fortify existing gang networks with relative ease. And, because of the large amount of disenfranchised youth in low-income neighborhoods of San Salvador and Guatemala City, for example, the deportees are able to find a plethora of new recruits. The Central American authorities are ill-equipped to receive deportees in such large numbers and have not sufficiently channeled their efforts into reintegration. Moreover, the local response has been draconian in nature, focusing on catching previous and current members and incarcerating them, often without due process, rather than offering resources for rehabilitation, education or opportunities for alternative income generation. These much publicized policies have also spurred vigilante groups to be involved in the process, only inciting further violence in the community. There have even been allegations of police-corroborated “social cleansing” of those affiliated with gangs, which may account for the sharp increase in homicides in recent years. In 2002, newly-elected President Ricardo Maduro of Honduras introduced a series of “zero tolerance” laws empowering Honduran police to imprison people for up to 12 years merely on suspicion of gang membership (often determined simply by the presence of distinctive tattoos, which members wear on their necks, arms, and legs). Maduro’s “mano dura” (“strong hand”) approach had an immediate impact and El Salvador soon adopted a similar program. Many young gang members were quickly thrown into prison. The immediate consequence was an over-crowded prison system with angry gangsters poised to reorganize. Prison riots and fires ensued and members yet to be caught retaliated against the policies by launching attacks of random violence, including beheadings and attacks involving public transportation. Human rights groups sharply criticized the new hard-line approaches as failing to provide suspected gang members with due process and adequate detention conditions. While local governments soon began to realize that tough legislation alone was not a sustainable solution, and many municipalities began to augment social and educational programs aimed at prevention and rehabilitation, these policies are not yet pervasive and take time to demonstrate success. By contrast, Nicaragua, despite having a similar rate of poverty and history of violence as other afflicted countries in Central America, provides one successful example of prevention through community coordination. Its policies include widespread police training programs, early warning systems, community centers for youth and a penal system that focuses on rehabilitation. Its legislation favors the protection of youth, which has been linked specifically to concrete programs focused on preventing youth violence. Through community involvement (education and empowerment aimed at at-risk youth) and, most significantly, the full support of the police forces who have established a high level of confidence and contact with the community, Nicaragua has been able to deflect the spread of transnational organized gang activity through its borders. While similar programs are in place in small numbers in El Salvador, Honduras, Mexico and Guatemala, pervasive incarcerations and deportations continue, compounding the problem. Moreover, as organized crime is less prosperous in Central America, many re-migrate north to the Mexican border and back into the United States where drug trafficking and smuggling in persons is more lucrative, thus perpetuating the cycle of deportation. Military influence a threat to peace Attempted coordination between the United States and Central America seems to reinforce the draconian law enforcement policies and threaten the foundations of the peace agreements signed at the end of the civil wars in the early 1990s. Organizations following meetings between the U.S. Department of Defense and the governments of Central America, such as the Washington Office on Latin America, draw attention to the worrisome blurring of lines between the Central American police and military forces, with the support of the United States. Governments of Central America, due to weak civilian police and judiciary systems, have sought U.S. support for a “rapid reaction force” to respond to transnational threats of organized crime, youth gangs and drug trafficking, among others, which will likely have a central role for the military. While the end of the civil wars brought a decline in the role of the militaries in Central America - a stated goal of the 1996 Guatemalan Peace Accords was to reduce the role of the military in civilian affairs and establish a civilian police force - new plans are being contemplated for joint police-military action to patrol crime-ridden areas.4 It remains to be seen whether these rapid reaction forces will coordinate with other regional and community-based efforts, many of them funded by development aid agencies, which focus on prevention and rehabilitation, or if they will include programs to provide further training for police and military officers that favor protection of youth. An analysis of the financial and material costs of violence, measured in medical expenses, institutional costs (public security and administration of justice), private security costs, deterioration in investment due to high risk, decreased consumption and savings due to low employment, among others, is surely a justification for coordinated spending and policy-making at the inter-governmental level. Addressing the needs of gang members While law-enforcement is a concern, transnational gangs are primarily a symptom of socio-economic challenges. Their criminalization by law enforcement agencies, which has mostly been accompanied by their stigmatization as “thugs,” will not assist with their permanent demise. Contributing heavily to this phenomenon has been the role of the media, which perpetuates their stigmatization and contributes to a deep-seated “mara-phobia.” As explained, the most pervasive response has been their targeting and subsequent detention, incarceration, or deportation (in the case of the United States), which has proven short-sighted and ineffective in the long-term. While gang members are considered criminals - and there is much evidence to corroborate this assertion - they are a party to a conflict like many others, necessitating a place at the negotiating table for the dispute to be solved. The gangs operate in an organized, hierarchical fashion, with several leaders (mostly men in their 30s or 40s) making the decisions for the younger masses. Reaching an agreement with gang leaders could have significant ripple effects for the community and consequently the region. While the gangs have no formal political power per se, many of the networks have de facto control over significant portions of their countries’ capitals and “govern” much of what occurs on the U.S.-Mexican border. They are armed non-state actors, unified by a desire to make an impact, as they react to their poverty, lack of education and general estrangement. Their unusual manifestations of violence are a protest to their lack of opportunity and are their way of exerting power. The unmistakable tattoos found on their arms, faces and necks exemplify a desire to be noticed and an affiliation with a support system absent in other areas (such as family and community). Recognizing and addressing the grievances of gang members as legitimate could have a significant effect in dismantling their networks. Once disbanded, the principal strategy should be facilitating alternative and sustainable income-generating opportunities, offering rehabilitation options and focusing on prevention of new and repeat gang involvement. The private sector should play a greater role in this regard. Needed are efforts to sensitize the media and professionalize, democratize and promote rights-respecting civilian police and law enforcement institutions throughout the region that maintain the demilitarization of public security institutions agreed upon in the peace accords of the 1990s. All efforts should be aimed at addressing the grievances and needs of the gang members, thereby alleviating their decision to become violent. Taryn Lesser is a consult in conflict prevention for HRI primarily focused on increasing the preventive capacity of inter-governmental organizations in Latin America and the Caribbean. She was previously based at the Association of Caribbean States in Port of Spain, Trinidad and now is working with the Organization of American States in Washington, DC. She is also the managing editor of a forthcoming publication on intra-regional migration and preventing conflict in the Greater Caribbean.
The general agreement from these meetings and studies is the need for a regionally coordinated, multi-sectoral response based on prevention, rehabilitation and law enforcement. Many advocate for an analysis and targeted response of the underlying factors of gang involvement - such as marginalization, stigmatization and discrimination, coupled with poverty and familial disruption - which can be addressed at the community level, thereby preventing gang involvement at a young age. In line with this strategy, a December 2005 preliminary assessment by USAID/Creative Associates International outlined a country-by-country plan based on early warning, intra-community dialogue, media training, private sector involvement (including micro-credit opportunities) and training for police forces (on alternative dispute resolution systems, for example), among other policy recommendations aimed at the well-being of the gang members and providing a strategy for their productive role in society.2
While well-intentioned and sound in their design, these coordination meetings and studies are likely to have little impact, as the policies of the governments of the United States, Honduras, El Salvador, Guatemala and Mexico run counter to prevention and rehabilitation. The bulk of the governmental funding to combat transnational gangs has been focused on tough anti-gang legislation and law enforcement and now potentially military spending. Due to these distinct approaches, there seems to be a fundamental gap between the agendas of the aid agencies, inter-governmental organizations, NGOs, and CBOs and the individual governments’ law-enforcement military policies. Any future strategies will have to incorporate prevention and rehabilitation with targeted training of the police forces to be effective.