Submitted by crinadmin on
ARGENTINA
Title:
R. 390. XLVI, "Reintegro de Hijo" (Return of Son)
Court:
Supreme Court of Argentina
Date:
21 December 2010
CRC Provisions:
Article 1: Definition of a child
Article 3: Best interests of the child
Other International Provisions:
Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction
Domestic Provisions:
Law 23,857 (legislation implementing the 1980 Hague Convention)
Law 23,849 (legislation implementing the Convention of the Rights of the Child)
Argentine Constitution
Case Summary:
Background:
An Argentinian woman and an American man residing together in the United States had a son in 2008. When the child was almost three years old, the mother travelled with the him to Argentina with the understanding that they would remain in Argentina for five months. However, the mother never returned, and after the child had been in Argentina for about six months, the father initiated legal proceedings to seek a court order for the return of his son. The father argued that he was entitled to have the child returned to the U.S. because the child had been illegally removed from his custody, as described in the 1980 Hague Convention (Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction). The mother countered that there were numerous reasons why the child should remain in Argentina, including that it was in the "best interests of the child," which the Convention of the Rights of the Child establishes as a "primary consideration" for any legal actions that involve children.
Issue and resolution:
International child custody; best interests of the child. The Court did not see the need to look at the best interests of the child separately from the Hague Convention, and ruled that the child should rightfully be returned to the United States.
Court reasoning:
Although courts should always keep the best interests of the child in mind in legal actions concerning children, it is not necessary to engage in a separate analysis of a child's best interests in cases relating to the return of children pursuant to the Hague Convention on International Child Abduction because the Convention was specifically designed to protect the best interests of the child in those cases. As the Hague Convention establishes that it is in the best interests of the child to return home after being unlawfully removed, the son should be sent back to the United States an there is no need to reassess his interests.
Excerpts citing CRC and other relevant human rights instruments
English translation:
1) That courtroom E of the National Court of Civil Appeals confirmed the previous court's ruling and sustained the request for the return of the M.A.R. boyto the city of Miami, state of Florida, United States of America, sought by his father, Mr M.A.R., through the procedure established in the Hague Convention of 1980 on Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. In its decision, the appeals court pointed out that the mother, here the defendant – M.B.F. –, was not unaware that up until the precise moment of the boy's transfer, both parents and the boy had resided in the said city and that the claimant had not consented to the transfer of the boy beyond the specified date in the instrument that appears on pp. 257-258 (31 January 2009).
It added that it had not been demonstrated that the return of the M.A.R child would involve great risk to him, or that it would threaten his physical or mental state or that it would place him in an intolerable situation. It acknowledged that given the boy's age, it had not been possible to fulfill his own wishes, however, he did receive sufficient representation from the ombudswomen for children and people with disabilities in both instances, who in their respective reports had urged that the boy's return be allowed. With that, it considered that none of the exemptions stated in article 13 of the Hague Convention (1980) had been successfully demonstrated, and neither had it been argued that the case fell into the provisions of article 20 of said Convention.
Lastly, the lower court concluded that the ruling issuedat first instance had been decided keeping the child's best interests in mind, which is imposed as a primary consideration by the Hague Convention (1980) and the Convention on the Rights of the Child. It also explained that the case required an urgent provisional solution, therefore it was inappropriate to debate the merits of the basic factors involved in the child’s custody at the time.
2) That against that decision, the child's mother filed an extraordinary appeal that was granted in fs. 697. This appeal argues that the decision violates constitutionally applicable laws such as Articles 1 and 3 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child and Articles 3, 11 and 13 of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction 1980 (CH 1980); and argues it was an arbitrary decision due to an erroneousand absurd application and interpretation of these provisions as well as ignoring the statements made by the defendant, the documentary evidence offered and the circumstances of fact and law asserted as exceptions to the application of the aforementioned CH 1980.
...
4) That, finally, the appellant argues that the appeals court has failed to consider the application of the interpretative rule asserting the superiority of the child’s best interests as foreseen in the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and has not taken into account the child’s welfare, which in this case clearly corresponds to M.A.R. continuing to reside in Argentina with his mother, where he has formed his family and social circle, speaks Spanish, attends kindergarten, has his general practitioner doctor and specific therapists - this is the best solution given his young age and inability to live with his father, due to all the issues raised that cannot be ignored.
5) That the special appeal is formally admissible since it questions the reasoning behind international conventions and the contested decision is contrary to the law from which the appellant seeks support (art. 14, inc. 3, of law 48).
...
9) ... In fact, in those precedents the Court emphasized that the immediate return procedure introduced by the CH 1980 is inspired by the primary consideration of the child’s best interests as provided by the Convention on the Rights of the Child - adopted by the law 23,849 - since in its preamble the signatories declare they are "profoundly convinced that the best interests of the child is of paramount importance in all matters relating to their custody,"; that there is no contradiction between these sources as both aim to protect the aforementioned interests, and that the CH 1980 makes the presumption that the child's welfare is secured by returning to the status quo before the act of wrongful removal or retention, preserving the best interests of the child by bringing the de facto proceedings to an end.
As published in full-text Spanish decision:
1) Que la Sala E de la Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Civil confirmó lo resuelto en la instancia anterior e hizo lugar al pedido de restitución del niño M.A.R. a la ciudad de Miami, Estado de La Florida, Estados Unidos de Norteamérica, instado por su padre, el señor M.A.R., mediante el procedimiento establecido en el Convenio de La Haya de 1980 sobre Aspectos Civiles de la Sustracción Internacional de Menores (CH 1980). Para así decidir, la alzada señaló que la madre, aquí demandada —M.B.F.—, no había desconocido que hasta el mismo momento del traslado del menor, ambos progenitores y el niño habían residido en la citada ciudad y que el actor no había consentido el traslado del mismo más allá de la fecha estipulada en el instrumento obrante a fs. 257/258 (31 de enero de 2009).
Agregó que no se había acreditado que la restitución implicase un grave riesgo para M.A.R., ni que con ello se pusiese en peligro su estado físico o psíquico o se lo colocase en una situación intolerable. Entendió que dada la edad del niño, no había sido posible atender a su voluntad, sin embargo, éste había tenido suficiente representación en las señoras Defensoras de Menores e Incapaces de ambas instancias, quienes en sus respectivos dictámenes habían solicitado que se admitiera la restitución pretendida. Con ello, consideró que no se había logrado demostrar ninguno de los supuestos de excepción previstos por el art. 13 del CH 1980, ni se había argumentado que el caso se encontrase dentro de las previsiones del art. 20 de dicho Convenio.
Por último, el a quo concluyó que la decisión adoptada en la instancia de grado había sido dictada teniendo en cuenta el interés superior del niño, que imponen como directiva general el CH 1980 y la Convención sobre los Derechos del Niño, y aclaró que se trataba de una solución de urgencia y provisoria, por lo que no correspondía debatir aquí la cuestión de fondo inherente a la tenencia del niño.
2) Que contra dicho pronunciamiento, la madre del menor interpuso recurso extraordinario que fue concedido a fs. 697. Sostiene que la sentencia vulnera normas de jerarquía constitucional como son los arts. 1º y 3º de la Convención sobre los Derechos del Niño y 3º, 11 y 13 del Convenio de La Haya sobre los Aspectos Civiles de la Sustracción Internacional de Menores de 1980 (CH 1980), y tacha de arbitraria la decisión porque ha efectuado una errónea y absurda aplicación e interpretación de dichas disposiciones y ha prescindido de las manifestaciones efectuadas por su parte, de la prueba documental ofrecida y de las circunstancias de hecho y de derecho alegadas como excepciones a la aplicación del citado CH 1980.
...
4) Que, por último, la recurrente concluye que la alzada ha omitido considerar la aplicación de la regla interpretativa del interés superior del niño prevista en la Convención sobre los Derechos del Niño y tampoco ha tenido en cuenta el bienestar del menor, lo que en el presente caso no puede implicar más que la circunstancia de que M.A.R. continúe residiendo en la República Argentina con su madre, lugar donde tiene conformado su núcleo familiar y social —habla castellano, concurre a un jardín de infantes; tiene a su médico de cabecera y terapeutas particulares—, lo que constituye la mejor solución dada su corta edad e imposibilidad de que viva con su padre en razón de todas las cuestiones apuntadas que no pueden ser desconocidas.
5) Que el recurso extraordinario resulta formalmente admisible dado que se ha puesto en tela de juicio la inteligencia de convenios internacionales y la decisión impugnada es contraria al derecho que la apelante pretende sustentar en aquéllos (art. 14, inc. 3º, de la ley 48).
...
9) ... En efecto, en dichos precedentes el Tribunal destacó que el procedimiento de restitución inmediata instaurado por el CH 1980 se encuentra inspirado en la regla del interés superior del niño establecida por la Convención sobre los Derechos del Niño —aprobada por la ley 23.849—, dado que en su preámbulo los Estados firmantes declaran estar “profundamente convencidos de que el interés del niño es de una importancia primordial para todas las cuestiones relativas a su custodia”; que no existe contradicción entre dichas fuentes en tanto ambas propenden a la protección del citado interés superior, y que el CH 1980 parte de la presunción de que el bienestar del niño se alcanza volviendo al statu quo anterior al acto de desplazamiento o retención ilícitos, preservando el mejor interés de aquél mediante el cese de la vía de hecho.
CRIN Comments:
CRIN believes this decision is consistent with the CRC in that, as recognised by the court, the Hague Convention on Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction was drafted with the best interests of the child in mind. The best interests of the child must be a primary consideration in every action concerning children under Article 3 of the CRC, and much like the CRC itself, the Hague Convention must be accepted as a binding obligation on ratifying countries and should be directly enforceable in the courts as here.
Citation:
R. 390. XLVI
Link to Full Judgment:
Download here via http://www.csjn.gov.ar/cfal/fallos/cfal3/cons_fallos.jsp
This case summary is provided by the Child Rights International Network for educational and informational purposes only and should not be construed as legal advice.
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