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ECtHR (UNITED KINGDOM)
Title:
Harkins and Edwards v. United Kingdom
Court:
European Court of Human Rights
Date:
17 January 2012
CRC Provisions:
Article 37: Torture and deprivation of liberty
Other International Provisions:
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“ECHR”): Article 3 (prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment), Article 5(4) (right to have lawfulness of detention decided speedily by a court)
Case Summary:
Background:
Two separate cases were decided in this judgment by the European Court of Human Rights (“Court”).
The Government of the United States sought the extradition of Harkins and Edwards, the applicants, who were aged 21 and 19 at the time of their offences. The applicants alleged that, inter alia, if extradited from the United Kingdom, they would be at risk of sentences of life imprisonment without parole, which was incompatible with Article 3 of the ECHR. Furthermore, Edwards argued that he was entitled to have his case examined under Article 5(4) of the ECHR.
Issue and resolution:
Life imprisonment without parole; proportionality of sentencing. The Court ruled that, in both cases, extradition would not constitute a violation of Article 3 of the ECHR. The Article 5(4) argument was rejected as manifestly ill-founded.
Court reasoning:
A “grossly disproportionate” sentence could amount to ill-treatment contrary to Article 3 at the moment of its imposition only in rare and unique occasions. Similarly, in a sufficiently exceptional case, an extradition would be in violation of Article 3 if the applicant were able to demonstrate that he or she was at a real risk of receiving a “grossly disproportionate” sentence in the receiving State.
Subject to the general requirement that a sentence should not be grossly disproportionate, the Court distinguished between three types of life sentences:
(i) a life sentence with eligibility for release after a minimum period has been served - this sentence is clearly reducible and no issue can therefore arise under Article 3;
(ii) a discretionary sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole - if this sentence is imposed by a court after due consideration of all relevant mitigating and aggravating factors, an Article 3 issue cannot arise at the moment when it is imposed; and
(iii) a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole - this sentence is not per se incompatible with the ECHR, but is much more likely to be grossly disproportionate than any of the other types of life sentence, especially if it requires the sentencing court to disregard mitigating factors such as youth or severe mental health problems.
Regarding a discretionary or mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, in the absence of gross disproportionality, an Article 3 issue will only arise when it can be shown: (i) that the applicant’s continued imprisonment can no longer be justified on any legitimate penological grounds (such as punishment, deterrence, public protection or rehabilitation); and (ii) that the sentence is irreducible for factual and legal reasons.
Regarding Harkins, the Court was not persuaded that a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without parole would be grossly disproportionate in his case. Although he was aged 20 at the time of the alleged offence, he was not a minor. Article 37(a) of the CRC demonstrates an international consensus against the imposition of life imprisonment without parole on children (under-18s) and would support the view that a sentence imposed on children would be grossly disproportionate. But the Court was not persuaded that this consensus applies to over-18s. Equally, the psychiatrist’s report did not diagnose the applicant with a psychiatric disorder. Therefore, the applicant did not possess mitigating factors which would indicate a significantly lower level of culpability on his part.
Regarding Edwards, he faced, at most, a discretionary sentence of life imprisonment without parole. Given that this sentence will only be imposed after consideration by the trial judge of all relevant aggravating and mitigating factors, and that it could only be imposed after the applicant’s conviction for a premeditated murder in which one other man was shot in the head and injured, the Court was unable to find that the sentence would be grossly disproportionate.
Both applicants failed to show that, upon extradition, their incarceration in the United States would not serve any legitimate penological purpose.
Regarding Article 5(4), the Court rejected this argument as the Court was satisfied that, if convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole, the lawfulness of Edwards’ detention required under Article 5(4) would be incorporated in the sentence imposed by the trial, and no further review would be required by Article 5(4).
Excerpts citing CRC and other relevant human rights instruments:
103. … The second applicant further relied on Article 37(a) of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, which prohibits the imposition of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for offences committed by persons below eighteen years of age, as evidence of a clear statement by the international community that, in the context of such sentences, the youth of the offender was of paramount importance.
…
116. The Government further submitted that the second applicant had been accused of a brutal ‘execution’ style murder of one victim and the attempted murder of another. He was not under eighteen at the time of the offences nor was he suffering from any mental impairment. The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child was therefore irrelevant and only demonstrative of an international consensus against life imprisonment without parole for those under the age of eighteen. The imposition of a sentence of life imprisonment without parole would not be grossly disproportionate in his case.
…
139. In the first applicant’s case, the Court notes that he faces a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without parole, which, as it has indicated, requires greater scrutiny than other forms of life sentence. However, the Court is not persuaded that such a sentence would be grossly disproportionate in his case. Although he was twenty years of age at the time of the alleged offence, he was not a minor. Article 37(a) of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child demonstrates an international consensus against the imposition of life imprisonment without parole on a young defendant who is under the age of eighteen. It would support the view that a sentence imposed on such a defendant would be grossly disproportionate. However, the Court is not persuaded that Article 37(a) demonstrates an international consensus against the imposition of life imprisonment without parole on a young defendant who is over the age of eighteen. …
Follow Up:
Harkins applied for the Grand Chamber of the Court to appeal the Court’s decision. However, the Court has rejected his request. Furthermore, he applied for the Divisional Court in the United Kingdom to reopen his case which was also denied. Meanwhile, Edwards was extradited to the United States in July 2012.
CRIN Comments:
CRIN believes this decision is consistent with the CRC. Article 37(a) prohibits the imposition of sentences of life imprisonment without parole for offences committed by persons below 18 years of age. Article 37 also provides that imprisonment of a child shall be used only as a measure of last resort and for the shortest appropriate period of time. The Court correctly observed that the CRC did not technically apply to this case as the applicant was over the age of 18 at the time of the offence.
Citation:
Application nos. 9146/07 and 32650/07
Link to Full Judgment:
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-108599
This case summary is provided by the Child Rights International Network for educational and informational purposes only and should not be construed as legal advice.
