Counting the cost
Twenty years of war in northern Uganda

Since 1986 northern Uganda has been trapped in a deadly cycle of violence and suffering. After 20 years the war shows no real signs of abating, and every day it goes on it exacts a greater toll from the women, men, and children affected by the crisis. The time has come for all parties involved to act decisively. The LRA, the Government of Uganda, and the international community must acknowledge the true scale and horror of the situation and act resolutely and without delay, both to guarantee the effective protection of civilians in the region and to secure a just and lasting peace.

CSOPNU is a coalition of more than 50 Ugandan and international non-governmental organisations working with women, men and children affected by the northern conflict.

CSOPNU believes that the needs and rights of people affected by the conflict must be central to the debate about northern Uganda.
Summary

Northern Uganda is trapped in a deadly cycle of violence and suffering. After 20 years the war shows no signs of abating, and each passing day takes a greater toll on the women, men, and children affected by the crisis.

Each month more than 3,500 people die from easily preventable diseases, extreme violence and torture. Hundreds of children are abducted and abused, or killed in battle. Nearly two million people are forced to live in squalid and life-threatening conditions, dependent upon relief and denied access to incomes and education. Millions of dollars are squandered in wasted productivity and in the pursuit of a military ‘solution’.

It is a situation that has produced a humanitarian catastrophe of dreadful proportions.

But this is a catastrophe that is fuelled not only by terrible acts of war and violence. It is also fuelled by a shameful litany of failure — the continuing failure of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) to cease its brutal campaign of violence against civilians, and of both the Government of Uganda (GoU) and the international community to uphold their legal obligations to secure the protection, security, and peace for the civilians of northern Uganda.

After 20 years, the time has come for all parties involved to act decisively. It is time for the LRA, the GoU, and the international community to fully acknowledge the true scale and horror of the situation in northern Uganda, and to act resolutely and without delay, both to guarantee the effective protection of civilians and to secure a just and lasting peace.

Recommendations

The Lord’s Resistance Army

The LRA must immediately cease attacks on, and abductions of, civilians and aid workers.

- It must show a clear commitment to resolving the conflict peacefully via negotiation.
- It should clearly declare its peace team and articulate its demands so that they are known and can be addressed.
The Government of Uganda

The GoU must make the protection of civilians its first priority and take immediate, concrete action to guarantee the protection of its citizens.

- It must prioritise the protection of civilians over the annihilation of the LRA, and shift its focus from military confrontation to building an environment of security for civilians.

- It must ensure the adequate deployment of UPDF troops in northern Uganda — particularly for the defence of IDP camps, the security of major access roads, and the protection of humanitarian organisations.

- It must drastically increase its commitment to upholding international humanitarian law in northern Uganda.

- It must give a clear signal that abuses perpetrated by the armed forces against civilians are intolerable. All instances of violence against civilians must be investigated and prosecuted to the highest extent of the law.

The GoU must also commit to resolving this conflict peacefully. Steps must be taken to establish an institutional mechanism through which dialogue can take place. Such a mechanism would enable talks to transcend individuals involved in the process. Adequate financial, political, and material support should be made available. Strength, determination, and resolve in the pursuit of a negotiated settlement are necessary, even in the face of setbacks.

The UN Security Council

The UN Security Council (UNSC) must act resolutely and without delay to guarantee the protection of civilians and those providing humanitarian assistance in northern Uganda. It should immediately adopt a resolution specifically addressing the conflict in northern Uganda. This resolution should express deep concern for the humanitarian emergency in the region and should also include the following key elements:

- Call on the GoU to acknowledge the severity of the humanitarian crisis;

- Express its conviction that the crisis in northern Uganda can only be ended via a process of political engagement, diplomacy, and peaceful negotiation, and call on all parties to declare an immediate ceasefire and pursue a peaceful and negotiated settlement.
• Urge the GoU to fulfil its responsibility to protect all of its civilians by adopting a more appropriate security strategy, focusing on protection rather than on confrontation.

• Establish a panel of experts to investigate and monitor the activities of the LRA, as well as networks supporting it, and their impact on regional peace and security.

• Express its firm conviction that failure on the part of the GoU to provide adequate protection for civilians will require further decisive action by the international community, via the Security Council.

The Council must also commit to following-up quickly on Resolution 1653 and to taking a comprehensive approach to situation in the Great Lakes region including, critically, the conflict in northern Uganda

**UN Secretary General**

The Secretary General must directly support the efforts of the UNSC and UN agencies to secure peace and the protection of civilians in northern Uganda.

• He should appoint a special envoy for northern Uganda to support efforts for a peaceful resolution of the conflict.

• He should act quickly to provide comprehensive recommendations to the Security Council pursuant to operative paragraph 14 of Resolution 1653, including concrete measures aimed at securing peace and protection for the people of northern Uganda consistent with the broader recommendations of this report.

• If the Security Council fails to place this crisis on its agenda, he should exercise Article 99 of the UN Charter to force it to do so and to take the above actions.

**International community**

The international community must radically improve their commitment to the protection and relief of civilians in northern Uganda, and to the achievement of a just and lasting peace.

• Governments must demonstrate this by applying co-ordinated and concerted diplomatic pressure upon the GoU to ensure that it focuses its resources on protection and on the peaceful resolution of the conflict.

• They must also ensure that the UN Security Council and the African Union gives northern Uganda the attention it warrants.
• The European Union must act on commitments made by the General Affairs and External Relations Council at the end of November 2005.

• Donors must commit to fully funding the UN’s consolidated appeal for Uganda.

**Regional governments**

Governments in the region should stand firm in their support for a peaceful resolution to this conflict.

• They must use their influence with the GoU to ensure that it makes the protection of civilians its first priority.

• They must wholeheartedly support efforts to resolve this conflict peacefully, including full co-operation in relevant international processes, e.g. the International Criminal Court.

• They must ensure that arms flows in the region are controlled, and that previous agreements made at the UN level are fully enforced.

They can do this through their involvement in regional bodies such as the African Union, Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), Tripartite Commission and the East African Community, or bilaterally.
1 Introduction

‘Where else in the world have there been 20,000 kidnapped children? Where else in the world have 90 per cent of the population in large districts been displaced? Where else in the world do children make up 80 per cent of the terrorist insurgency movement?... For me, the situation is a moral outrage... A much bigger international investment [is needed] — in money, in political engagement, in diplomacy and also more concerted efforts to tell the parties there is no military solution... there is a solution through reconciliation, an end to the killing and the reintegration and demobilisation of the child combatants.’

Jan Egeland, UN Under Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Co-ordinator, October 2004

2006 is an exciting year for Uganda. It not only heralds the first multi-party elections for over a quarter of a century, but also marks 20 years of relative stability, peace, and prosperity experienced by many Ugandans since the National Resistance Movement (NRM) assumed power in 1986.

This period has seen Uganda’s international reputation shift from ‘basket-case’ to ‘donor darling’, has seen President Museveni garner a reputation as one of a ‘new generation’ of African leaders, and has witnessed the unfolding of a Ugandan development ‘success story’.

Box 1: Uganda achievements 1986–2006

- Implementation of an IMF/World Bank-designed Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) emphasising macro-economic stability, trade liberalisation, deficit spending constraint, and privatisation.

- GDP growth rates rose from minus 3.3 per cent in 1985 to 11.3 per cent in 1995, before settling back to 5.9 per cent in 2005, while the rate of inflation shrank dramatically from 155 per cent in 1985 to 5 per cent in 2004.

- The incidence of poverty at the national level declined from 56 per cent in 1992 to 37.3 per cent in 2003.

- National HIV/AIDS infection rates dropped from 18 per cent in the early 1992 to 6.4 per cent in 2005.

- Rural access to safe water sources increased from levels as low as 7.4 per cent in 1982 to 55 per cent in 2004.
Yet, as the Government of Uganda (GoU) and its development partners celebrate these achievements, they obscure a quite different Ugandan reality that has festered, largely ignored, for 20 years, one that colours Uganda's success with a shadow.

It is a reality in which almost 8 per cent of Uganda’s population have been forced to live in extreme poverty and suffering, ravaged by a war that targets civilians and children; in which 1.8 million people are forced to live in squalid and life-threatening conditions, displaced from their homes by violence and coercion; in which tens of thousands of children are unable to sleep in their beds for fear of abduction; in which violence, torture, and abuse have become normal; in which livelihoods have been destroyed, cultural norms have collapsed, and where hope for the future of an entire generation has withered away.

This is the story of northern Uganda, a region which is now home to both ‘the world’s largest forgotten emergency’ and sub-Saharan Africa’s longest-running war, a region which has failed to taste the benefits of Uganda’s development miracle, and which is becoming ever more marginalised with each passing year.

It is a region that in 2006 marks its own terrible 20th anniversary.

Box 2: Northern Uganda: key facts

Internal displacement
- Between 1.8 and 2 million people are internally displaced and living in camps (about 8 per cent of the national population).
- Approximately 1.2 million of these people are internally displaced in the northern districts of Gulu, Kitgum, and Pader (representing 94 per cent of the local population).
- In Gulu, Kitgum, and Pader an area the size of Belgium is now depopulated.
- There are 202 IDP camps in northern Uganda, some with populations of over 60,000.
- Population density in some camps is as high as 1,700 people per hectare.
- 50 per cent of IDPs are under the age of 15.

Mortality
- Rates of violent death are three times higher than those reported in Iraq following the Allied invasion in 2003.
- Crude mortality rates are more than three times higher than those recorded in Darfur in October 2005.
- There are 901 excess deaths every week. This means 129 people die every day as a result of violence and conditions in camps.
• Each day, 58 children under the age of five die as a result of violence and preventable diseases.

Abduction
• More than 25,000 children have been abducted during the course of the war.
• At times of heightened insecurity up to 45,000 children ‘night-commute’ each evening to avoid abduction by the LRA.

Education
• 737 schools in northern Uganda (60 per cent of the total) are non-functioning because of the war.
• 250,000 children in northern Uganda receive no education at all.

Humanitarian access
• 80 per cent of the camps in Gulu, Kitgum, and Pader cannot be accessed without military escorts.

Economic costs
• 95 per cent of IDPs in Gulu, Kitgum, and Pader live in absolute poverty.
• Cost of the war to Uganda after 20 years: $1.7bn.
• Cost of the war to Uganda annually over 20 years: $85m.
• The annual cost of the war is approximately equivalent to Uganda’s total annual income from coffee exports.
• The equivalent amount of money could provide clean, safe drinking water to 3.5 million people per year - or the total population of Liberia. 15
2 Twenty years of war

Since the National Resistance Movement (NRM) assumed power in 1986, some 20 armed groups have either been defeated militarily or appeased diplomatically by the GoU. Despite this strong record, however, peace remains elusive in northern Uganda.

The region has been in the grip of civil war since 1986, when soldiers from the defeated United National Liberation Army (UNLA) fled Kampala for their homelands in the north and regrouped as the Uganda People’s Democratic Army (UPDA), with the intention of retaking power by force of arms.

Since then, six successive rebel groups have waged a series of military campaigns against the GoU in Acholiland. The latest of these, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), continues to fight a brutal guerrilla war, in which it claims to be seeking an end to both the marginalisation of the Acholi people and to the Museveni regime.

A war against civilians

While the war began as a fairly orthodox conflict between military forces, over the years it has become a ‘dirty war’ in which civilians are the principal victims of military violence.

This metamorphosis took place in 1994, when the LRA began systematically attacking civilian rather than military targets in an attempt to terrorise the Acholi population, to steal critical resources such as food, and to abduct children.

Since then the LRA has engaged in an increasingly intense campaign of abuses against civilians, including assault, murder, rape, defilement (sexual abuse of minors), mutilation, torture, forced labour, and the use of children as soldiers. In particular, this is a war waged against children, who have been abducted in their thousands and forced to act as child soldiers or sex slaves. Eighty per cent of LRA soldiers are estimated to be abducted children.

LRA massacres

From 1994 a cyclical pattern of violence emerged in northern Uganda, including periodic large-scale massacres of civilians by the LRA. This period of intensifying violence peaked in January 1997 with the massacre of 412 women, men, and children in Kitgum district — the largest single attack upon civilians in the history of the war.
This period also saw the start of large-scale internal displacement in the region, including both the first spontaneous displacement of civilians in Kitgum district\textsuperscript{24} and the GoU’s formal announcement of a counter-insurgency strategy that forced civilians into camps euphemistically labelled ‘protected villages’.\textsuperscript{25} This strategy persists today.

The Sudan factor

In 1994 the LRA began receiving military support from the Government of Sudan (GoS) as part of a ‘proxy war’ waged against the GoU.\textsuperscript{26} Throughout the late 1990s the conflict continued to simmer, but with the LRA now moving to and fro between northern Uganda and southern Sudan with the changing seasons.

Gradually the rebels came to spend more and more time within southern Sudan, and 2000/01 saw levels of violence in northern Uganda decrease dramatically, leading optimists within the humanitarian community to start planning return, resettlement, and rehabilitation programmes for IDPs.

Operation Iron Fist

This optimism was dashed in May 2002 when the Ugandan army launched Operation Iron Fist (OIF), a large-scale military campaign in which troops entered southern Sudan with the objective of ending the war by a decisive military victory over the LRA.

Sadly, the very opposite came to pass. Instead of crushing the rebels, OIF stirred up a hornets’ nest, driving most of the LRA back into northern Uganda, where it began a brutal campaign of massacres, abductions, and attacks on humanitarian organisations.

Humanitarian crisis

This campaign sparked unprecedented levels of internal displacement, created a security vacuum within Acholiland, and brought almost all relief operations to a halt.

A humanitarian crisis of huge proportions unfolded as hundreds of thousands of people crowded into highly congested, poorly serviced, and inaccessible camps. The crisis was exacerbated by a UPDF order issued on 3 October 2002 that all civilians living in Acholiland should move into camps within 48 hours.\textsuperscript{27}

The situation was made yet worse when in early 2003 the LRA launched a series of deliberate and well co-ordinated attacks in the
Teso and Lango regions of north eastern Uganda, areas that were previously unaffected by the conflict.  

Levels of internal displacement increased rapidly. By early 2004 the registered number of internally displaced people (IDPs) in the war-affected region had swollen to 1.6 million, though the actual figure was estimated to be closer to 2 million. This figure included over 90 per cent of the population of Acholiland. Northern Uganda became the world’s fourth largest internal displacement crisis.

No end in sight

Since that time little has changed. Operation Iron Fist has failed to secure the military victory it promised. The LRA remains active and as deadly as ever, and millions of civilians remain subject to extreme violence on a daily basis.
Approximately 1.8 IDPs remain trapped in squalid camps, preyed upon by the LRA, and provided with little meaningful protection against violence, coercion, and deprivation.

To date, two separate peace processes have been undermined by a lack of commitment, patience, and good faith from both parties; in spite of recent LRA calls for further negotiation, no peace process is currently active.

The issue of arrest warrants for five LRA leaders by the International Criminal Court (ICC) in October 2005 appears not to have alleviated the situation, and may indeed have jeopardised the security of civilians, sparking increases in LRA violence and attacks on humanitarian organisations.

In October 2005 the LRA extended its sphere of operations into the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), potentially threatening the peace and security of the entire region. The killing in January 2006 of eight MONUC (United Nations Organization Mission in the DRC) soldiers in an ambush in DRC belies the GoU’s statements that the LRA is ‘in the throes of its extermination’.

Northern Uganda remains trapped in a deadly cycle of violence and suffering, with no clear end in sight.
3 Counting the costs

Human costs

Internal displacement

Today there are more than 200 IDP camps in northern Uganda, accommodating approximately 1.8 million people. An unknown number of people have also taken refuge in the towns of northern Uganda. This means that the total number of IDPs in the region may be close to two million, equivalent to 8 per cent of Uganda’s total population.

Box 3: IDP demographics

- There are 202 IDP camps in northern Uganda.
- Between 1.8 and 2 million people are displaced (approximately 8 per cent of the national population).
- In some camps population density exceeds 1,700 people per hectare.
- 50 per cent of IDPs are under the age of 15.
- 25 per cent of children over 10 years of age have lost one or both of their parents.
- There is a large absence of adult males aged 20-29, as a direct result of the war.
- 12 per cent of females aged 30-44 are widows — twice the national average.

Of these IDPs, just over 75 per cent (about 1.2 million) are located in the Acholi districts of Kitgum, Gulu, and Pader. Almost 94 per cent of the Acholi population are now living in 105 IDP camps, leaving an area the size of Belgium almost totally depopulated.

While many of the camps emerged spontaneously in response to LRA violence, many were created following forced displacement orders by the UPDF. These orders served to worsen an already severe humanitarian crisis, creating camp populations that in some locations exceed 60,000.

Population densities in some camps exceed 1,700 people per hectare, densities higher even than those in Africa’s most notorious urban slums. This congestion has caused huge suffering for the affected population, with extremely high levels of excess morbidity and mortality, extremely low levels of access to basic services (especially water, sanitation, health care, and education),
high levels of dependency upon relief assistance (especially food), and extreme levels of absolute poverty.

**Mortality**

The total number of lives lost over the course of the war is unknown. However, recent studies have shed light on the current levels of mortality arising within the IDP population due directly to violence and to war-related disease.

**Box 4: Crude mortality (January–July 2005)**

- Total deaths Acholi IDP camps: approx 35,000
- Crude mortality rate (CMR) Acholi camps: 1.54/10,000 people/day
- CMR Rest of Uganda: 0.46/10,000 people/day
- CMR Darfur, Sudan: 0.48/10,000 people/day

The figures are shocking. When compared with those from more publicised emergencies such as that in Darfur, they constitute a shameful indictment of the neglect and apathy from which northern Uganda has suffered for the past 20 years.

**Crude Mortality Rates for Acholi IDP Camps Compared to Uganda and Darfur**

It is estimated that between January and July 2005 approximately 35,000 people died in the IDP camps of Gulu, Kitgum, and Pader districts. This means that the death rates in the camps are three
times the national average (a crude mortality rate of 1.54 people per 10,000 per day, compared with 0.46 nationally) and indicate that northern Uganda is experiencing a very serious humanitarian emergency.47

Disturbingly, this figure is also nearly three times that recently reported for Darfur by the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS).48

Violent deaths

The GoU insists that the LRA’s military capability has been almost totally destroyed by its military efforts.49 It also insists that the military protection provided to civilians in IDP camps is effective and life-saving, and that all IDPs will be able to return to their homes in safety in the very near future.50 Given these claims, the findings on death by violence are particularly worrying.51

Box 5: Violent deaths in Acholi IDP camps

- Total violent deaths (January-July 2005) 3,971
- Violent deaths per week 146
- Deaths by violence in Acholiland 0.17/10,000 people/day
- Deaths by violence in Iraq 0.052/10,000 people/day

Between January and July 2005, almost 4,000 people in the IDP camps of Gulu, Kitgum, and Pader died as a result of violence. This is equivalent to 146 killings per week, or 21 people killed each day, giving a violent death rate of about 0.17 killings per 10,000 people per day.
Violent Deaths
Northern Uganda Compared to Iraq

Shockingly, this figure is more than three times higher than the figure reported for Iraq in the period following the Allied invasion in 2003, when the incidence of violent death was estimated to be in the region of 0.01–0.052 killings per 10,000 people per day.\(^5^2\)

Not all violent deaths in northern Uganda are caused by the LRA. The UPDF and the Local Defence Units (LDUs)\(^5^3\) deployed to protect civilians in camps have also been responsible for serious acts of violence against civilians, including murder.\(^5^4\)

**Excess mortality**

Of the total number of deaths in the Acholi IDP camps, 72 per cent were excess deaths. Excess deaths are those deaths that would not have occurred under normal conditions, and which in this case therefore result directly from the war.\(^5^5\)

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<th>Box 6: Excess mortality</th>
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<td>• Total excess deaths (January-July 2005)</td>
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<td>• Total excess deaths per week</td>
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<td>• Total excess deaths per day</td>
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<td>• Excess deaths as % of all deaths</td>
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The vast majority of these excess deaths can be attributed directly to the poor living conditions, poor water and sanitation, inadequate health care provision and health education, and extreme poverty that are found in the camps. Leaving aside violence, the most common killers were malaria (28.5 per cent of deaths), HIV/AIDS (13.5 per cent), and diarrhoea (7.6 per cent).  

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<th>Box 7: Under 5s mortality rates (January–July 2005)</th>
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<tr>
<td>• Total deaths in children under 5</td>
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<td>• Deaths in U5s per week</td>
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<td>• U5s mortality rate (Acholi IDP camps)</td>
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<tr>
<td>• U5s mortality rate (Ugandan average)</td>
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<td>• U5s mortality rate (emergency threshold)</td>
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Children under the age of five (U5s) accounted for 41 per cent of all deaths in the camps, indicating clearly that young children bear the brunt of this war’s human impact. Over 400 children under the age of five die each week from easily preventable diseases. More than 10,000 are estimated to have died between January and July 2005. Most of them died from malaria/fever, two lango, or coughs. Mortality rates for U5s in the Acholi camps are three times those expected under non-crisis conditions, and more than three times the national average for Uganda.

**Food insecurity**

Northern Uganda has faced serious food insecurity for much of the past ten years. The region is predominantly agricultural, with an economy that is largely dependent upon subsistence cultivation, with some cash cropping (tobacco, cotton, rice). Since 2002 this economy has collapsed.

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<th>Box 8: Food insecurity</th>
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<tr>
<td>• IDP households with no access to land</td>
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<td>• IDP households dependent upon food relief</td>
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<td>• Stunted children in Kitgum district</td>
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</table>
In September 2005 only 22 per cent of households in Acholiland had access to land of any kind. Thus 78 per cent of a population usually dependent upon subsistence farming have either been forced to leave their land altogether, or are unable to access it due to the threat of violence from the LRA or due to the orders of the UPDF.

Levels of cultivation in the region are miniscule and the vast majority of households are dependent upon food relief. The World Food Programme (WFP) currently delivers food to 84 per cent of all households, providing an average ration of 60 per cent of the total daily requirement.

This situation has produced high levels of both chronic and acute malnutrition, with malnutrition levels in 2005 slightly up on previous years. About 48 per cent per cent of children in Kitgum are stunted from chronic malnutrition, and acute malnutrition is an important underlying contributor to overall childhood mortality in the camps, (especially related to diarrhoea).

**Abduction**

The war’s disproportionate impact on children is also reflected in the data relating to child abductions by the LRA over the past 20 years.

UNICEF estimates that more than 25,000 children have been abducted in the course of the war, all stolen from their families and carried into the bush to face an uncertain future as child soldiers, porters, and sex slaves. Of these, 7,000 were girls, of whom 1,000 are estimated to have conceived children themselves during captivity.

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**Box 9: Abduction**

- Over 25,000 children have been abducted during the war.
- Approximately 70 per cent of abductees are boys, 30 per cent are girls.
- 12,000 children have been abducted since June 2002 (around 357 per month).
- At times of heightened insecurity up to 45,000 children ‘night-commute’ daily to escape abduction.

The Coalition for Human Rights and Justice Initiative for Northern Uganda (CHRJINU) has estimated that between 1990 and 2001...
around 10,000 children were abducted, giving an average rate of approximately 75 children per month.\textsuperscript{65}

Since the start of Operation Iron Fist the rate of child abduction has skyrocketed. Since June 2002, approximately 15,000 children have been abducted, giving an average abduction rate of around 357 per month.\textsuperscript{66}

The threat of abduction has produced the unique phenomenon of ‘night-commuting’. Every night, in an attempt to evade the threat of capture, thousands of children leave their homes and make a long and dangerous journey to take refuge in urban centres across northern Uganda. In periods of high insecurity the number of children commuting across the region can exceed 45,000.\textsuperscript{67}

They are forced to bed down in their thousands in night-commuter shelters, in schools, health centres, and public buildings, or merely along the verandas of shops and houses, in the hope that they will find safety from harm. Sadly, however, these children are often exposed to other, equally dangerous threats in their place of refuge, threats such as violence, sexual assault, and rape.\textsuperscript{68}

\textbf{Education}

Education is highly prized in northern Uganda, and the impacts of the war upon the region’s educational system are keenly felt. Twenty years of war have seriously undermined the educational potential of an entire generation of children, destroying the region’s prospects for future development.

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\textbf{Box 10: Education} \\
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\textbullet\ Sixty per cent of schools in Acholiland are non-functioning. \\
\textbullet\ 250,000 children receive no education. \\
\textbullet\ Pupil/teacher ratios of 300:1 are reported. \\
\textbullet\ Only 1.8 per cent of primary students in Kitgum enter secondary education. \\
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In June 2005 UNICEF reported that 60 per cent of primary schools in Gulu, Kitgum, Pader, Lira, and Apac districts were non-functional due to forced displacement. As a result, 25 per cent of all displaced primary school children are currently not in school, and 250,000 children in total are not attending any form of school whatsoever.\textsuperscript{69}

This is in spite of Uganda’s policy of free Universal Primary Education (UPE).
Even for those lucky enough to have access to schooling, conditions are appalling. Pupil/teacher ratios are three times higher than the national standard, with levels as high as 150:1 in Kitgum and 300:1 in Pader. Pupil/classroom ratios are also unsatisfactory, with 400:1 reported in Kitgum.

There are also serious concerns about the lack of access to secondary schooling. In Kitgum district only about 2,000 children enter secondary school annually, a number roughly equivalent to just 1.5 per cent of all those who attended primary school. IDPs in Kitgum indicate that the main obstacle blocking access to secondary education is the lack of income that has resulted from forced displacement, and which makes the payment of school fees impossible.

**Insecurity and humanitarian access**

Insecurity is the most important single factor in the perpetuation of the humanitarian crisis in northern Uganda. Yet the UPDF and GoU insist that the IDP camps are effectively protected by the UPDF, that secure access is guaranteed to all IDP camps, that final victory over the LRA is imminent, and that all IDPs will be able to return home soon.

These claims do not reflect the experience of people living in northern Uganda or of agencies working there. Neither are they supported by the evidence presented here, which shows clearly that levels of insecurity continue to pose a significant threat to the lives of civilians, and therefore that IDPs are not protected effectively by the GoU’s current military strategy of confrontation.

Insecurity has also made it extremely difficult for humanitarian agencies to provide the levels of relief and assistance that are desperately needed to ensure the fulfilment of IDPs’ most basic rights.

The levels of insecurity are so bad that most NGOs are unable to implement projects effectively. This has had an extremely negative impact upon the quality and quantity of aid provided in the region and has contributed greatly to the worsening of the humanitarian crisis since 2002.

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**Box 11: Humanitarian access in Acholiland, October 2005**

IDP camps accessible only with military escort
In 2002 a series of LRA attacks on humanitarian organisations\textsuperscript{76} prompted many NGOs to begin operating very tight security guidelines, often restricting their sphere of operations to urban areas, operating via ‘remote control’ implementation mechanisms, or using the strategy of absolute last resort — the use of military escorts.\textsuperscript{77}

Once again, comparisons can be drawn with more high-profile crises, such as those in Iraq, Afghanistan, Chechnya, and Somalia, crises that are more generally perceived as highly insecure, but where very similar operational principles must also be employed.

The highly volatile humanitarian situation in northern Uganda continues today. In October 2005 three aid workers were killed in LRA ambushes. These killings prompted many agencies to restrict their work in the region once again, giving rise to serious fears that death rates in the camps would rise due to interruptions in the delivery of life-saving supplies of food, water, and medicine.\textsuperscript{78}

**Economic costs**

The human costs of the conflict are shocking, but the war also has broader impacts upon the economies of both the northern region and of the country as a whole.

**Net economic cost of the war**

In 2002 Civil Society Organisations for Peace in Northern Uganda (CSOPNU) estimated that the net economic cost of the war to Uganda between 1985 and 2002 was around $1.33bn, or just over 3 per cent of annual GDP. Their report estimated that, on average, the war cost the country about $100m per year, or the equivalent of the annual budget of the Ministry of Health.\textsuperscript{79} It clearly showed that the war in the north poses a serious threat to the general development of the Ugandan economy.
Box 12: Net economic cost of the war

Cost to Uganda (1986-2006) $1.7bn (£1bn)
Cost to northern Uganda (1986-2006) $864m (£547m)

* N.B. Calculated using Uganda Shilling exchange rates (constant 2005)

Now, after 20 years of war, it is possible to roughly estimate the full economic cost of the war at around $1.7bn or £1bn.80 This is approximately equivalent to:

- Double the UK’s bilateral gross public expenditure on aid to Uganda between 1994 and 2001;81
- The USA’s total aid to Uganda between 1994 and 2002;82
- Twice the total tax revenue of the GoU in 2003/04.83

Over the years the annual cost of the war has steadily increased, at an average rate of 14.7 per cent a year. Average annual costs over the past four years, however, amount to approximately $133m or £60m per year. This is approximately equivalent to:

- Uganda’s total annual income from coffee exports;84
- The entire budget of the World Bank’s five-year Northern Uganda Social Action Fund (NUSAF)
- The amount of money required to provide clean, safe drinking water to 3.5 million new people per year.85
- The USA’s average annual economic assistance to Uganda (all loans and grants) between 1997 and 2003.86
- The UK’s average annual bilateral gross public expenditure on aid to Uganda from 1994 to 2004, which was £62.6n per year.87

Average annual costs to the Ugandan economy over the entire 20-year period stand at around $85m per year.

Poverty

Northern Uganda has borne the brunt of the war’s economic cost. Insecurity, displacement, and inadequate provision of relief have combined to destroy the local economy.

The total cost to the northern region alone is estimated at around $864m (£547m), with the vast majority of these losses relating to opportunity costs from lost agricultural production (arising from forced displacement), and lost labour productivity (arising from ill health and loss of life).
These losses are clearly reflected in the incidence of poverty in the region. Between 1992 and 2000, national levels of absolute poverty shrank by 21 percentage points, from 56 per cent to 35 per cent, largely as a result of increases in national growth rates. Northern Uganda, however, has failed to benefit equally from this growth. In the same period, the region experienced an overall reduction in absolute poverty of only 6 percentage points, from 72 per cent to 66 per cent.

The extent of absolute poverty in Acholiland was reflected clearly in a recent survey of IDP camps, which showed that 68 per cent of IDPs earned absolutely nothing in the month previous to their interview (see chart below).
Taking into account the fact that most of those living in the camps live in conditions that are ‘degraded by disease, malnutrition, and squalor’ and are denied the basic human necessities, it is fair to estimate that around 95 per cent of the 1.2 million people living in the Acholi IDP camps suffer absolute poverty.\textsuperscript{91}

Political costs

The war in northern Uganda has also cost the government important political capital, particularly over the past three years.

Since 2002, the GoU has focused more or less exclusively upon its military operation to destroy the LRA. With each passing year it has become more obvious that this strategy is failing, as shown clearly by the levels of violence noted above.

In addition, the GoU’s failure to resolve the conflict peacefully has produced significant levels of resentment and frustration within large sectors of the Ugandan population. Ill feeling toward the GoU has increased and tensions between ethnic groups in the region risk being exacerbated by the continuing conflict.

The fact that thousands of members of civilian militia have been armed and trained across the country in recent years also gives rise to fear that the war in the north may cause Uganda to collapse into a wider civil war along ethnic/regional lines.

The regional dimension

Finally, recent months have shown that a failure to resolutely pursue a peaceful, negotiated settlement with the LRA may
seriously threaten the peace and stability of the wider Central Africa/Great Lakes region.

Since the signing of the OIF protocol between the GoU and the GoS in 2002, pressure has been mounting on the LRA in southern Sudan, as they have been squeezed increasingly between the forces of the UPDF, SAF, and SPLA.

In late 2005, LRA soldiers made incursions into DRC, either in an attempt to link up with other military groups or simply to seek breathing space. Since they have been there, they have engaged in battle with MONUC troops and have caused the GoU to threaten the deployment of the UPDF into DRC once again.

In the absence of a serious peace process designed to defuse the LRA threat, such developments could have the potential not only to jeopardise the peace processes under way in both Sudan and DRC, but also to spark serious military conflict between nation states.
4 Conclusion

A moral outrage

Northern Uganda is trapped in a deadly web of violence and suffering. After 20 years, the war shows no signs of abating and each passing day takes a greater toll on the women, men, and children affected by the crisis.

Each month, over 3,500 people die from easily preventable diseases, violence and torture. Hundreds of children are abducted and abused, or killed in military battles. Over 1.8 million people are forced to live in squalid and life-threatening conditions, dependent upon relief and denied access to incomes and education. Millions of dollars are squandered in wasted productivity and in the pursuit of a military ‘solution’.

It is a situation that has produced a humanitarian catastrophe of dreadful and intolerable proportions. As UN Under Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs Jan Egeland has noted, it is a moral outrage.

A litany of failure

This is a catastrophe that is fuelled not only by terrible acts of war and violence. It is also fuelled by a shameful litany of failure – the continuing failure of the LRA to cease its brutal campaign of violence against civilians, and the failure of both the Government of Uganda and the international community to uphold their legal obligations to secure the protection, security, and peace of the civilians of northern Uganda. In particular:

• The LRA has failed to show its commitment to peace and to ceasing violence against civilians. Despite its recent calls for peace talks, the LRA continues to murder, torture, and abduct civilians. Joseph Kony has failed to engage directly in peace negotiations.

• The military strategy has failed. The GoU insists that the only way to end the war is via its strategy of military confrontation. Yet the rebels’ violent attacks on civilians in towns and IDP camps show no signs of abating.

• The GoU’s current strategy for protecting civilians is not effective. Nearly two million people continue to suffer extreme
levels of violence from the LRA, UPDF, and LDUs, and live in conditions that directly threaten their lives.

- **Efforts to resolve the conflict peacefully have so far failed.** A continued focus on settling the conflict by military means has undermined efforts at peace building and negotiated settlement. Peace efforts have also been undermined by inadequate levels of commitment, patience, and good will from all parties.

- **The international community has failed to intervene meaningfully to reinforce the protection of civilians.** International donor governments have both directly and tacitly supported the failing military strategy. They have failed to apply adequate public pressure on the GoU to protect civilians effectively, and have consistently underfunded all humanitarian appeals for the crisis. Inaction at the international level is reflected by inaction within the United Nations.

After 20 years, the time has come for all parties involved to take up Jan Egeland’s challenge and to act decisively. It is time for the LRA, the GoU, and the international community to fully acknowledge the true scale and horror of the situation in northern Uganda, and to act resolutely and without delay, both to guarantee the effective protection of civilians, and to secure a just and lasting peace.

**Recommendations**

**The Lord’s Resistance Army**

The LRA must immediately cease attacks on, and abductions of, civilians and aid workers.

- It must show a clear commitment to resolving the conflict peacefully via negotiation.
- It should clearly declare its peace team and articulate its demands so that they are known and can be addressed.

**The Government of Uganda**

The GoU must make the protection of civilians its first priority and take immediate, concrete action to guarantee the protection of its citizens.

- It must prioritise the protection of civilians over the annihilation of the LRA, and shift its focus from military confrontation to building an environment of security for civilians.
- It must ensure the adequate deployment of UPDF troops in northern Uganda — particularly for the defence of IDP camps,
the security of major access roads, and the protection of humanitarian organisations.

- It must drastically increase its commitment to upholding international humanitarian law in northern Uganda.

- It must give a clear signal that abuses perpetrated by the armed forces against civilians are intolerable. All instances of violence against civilians must be investigated and prosecuted to the highest extent of the law.

The GoU must also commit to resolving this conflict peacefully. Steps must be taken to establish an institutional mechanism through which dialogue can take place. Such a mechanism would enable talks to transcend individuals involved in the process. Adequate financial, political, and material support should be made available. Strength, determination, and resolve in the pursuit of a negotiated settlement are necessary, even in the face of setbacks.

The UN Security Council
The UN Security Council (UNSC) must act resolutely and without delay to guarantee the protection of civilians and those providing humanitarian assistance in northern Uganda. It should immediately adopt a resolution specifically addressing the conflict in northern Uganda. This resolution should express deep concern for the humanitarian emergency in the region and should also include the following key elements:

- Call on the GoU to acknowledge the severity of the humanitarian crisis;

- Express its conviction that the crisis in northern Uganda can only be ended via a process of political engagement, diplomacy, and peaceful negotiation, and call on all parties to declare an immediate ceasefire and pursue a peaceful and negotiated settlement

- Urge the GoU to fulfil its responsibility to protect all of its civilians by adopting a more appropriate security strategy, focusing on protection rather than on confrontation.

- Establish a panel of experts to investigate and monitor the activities of the LRA, as well as networks supporting it, and their impact on regional peace and security.

- Express its firm conviction that failure on the part of the GoU to provide adequate protection for civilians will require further decisive action by the international community, via the Security Council.
The Council must also commit to following-up quickly on Resolution 1653 and to taking a comprehensive approach to situation in the Great Lakes region including, critically, the conflict in northern Uganda

**UN Secretary General**

The Secretary General must directly support the efforts of the UNSC and UN agencies to secure peace and the protection of civilians in northern Uganda.

- He should appoint a special envoy for northern Uganda to support efforts for a peaceful resolution of the conflict.
- He should act quickly to provide comprehensive recommendations to the Security Council pursuant to operative paragraph 14 of Resolution 1653, including concrete measures aimed at securing peace and protection for the people of northern Uganda consistent with the broader recommendations of this report.
- If the Security Council fails to place this crisis on its agenda, he should exercise Article 99 of the UN Charter to force it to do so and to take the above actions.

**International community**

The international community must radically improve their commitment to the protection and relief of civilians in northern Uganda, and to the achievement of a just and lasting peace.

- Governments must demonstrate this by applying co-ordinated and concerted diplomatic pressure upon the GoU to ensure that it focuses its resources on protection and on the peaceful resolution of the conflict.
- They must also ensure that the UN Security Council and the African Union gives northern Uganda the attention it warrants.
- The European Union must act on commitments made by the General Affairs and External Relations Council at the end of October 2005.
- Donors must commit to fully funding the UN’s consolidated appeal for Uganda.

**Regional governments**

Governments in the region should stand firm in their support for a peaceful resolution to this conflict.

- They must use their influence with the GoU to ensure that it makes the protection of civilians its first priority.
• They must wholeheartedly support efforts to resolve this conflict peacefully, including full co-operation in relevant international processes, e.g. the International Criminal Court.

• They must ensure that arms flows in the region are controlled, and that previous agreements made at the UN level are fully enforced.

They can do this through their involvement in regional bodies such as the African Union, Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), Tripartite Commission and the East African Community, or bilaterally.
# Glossary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CHRJINU</td>
<td>Coalition for Human Rights and Justice Initiative for Northern Uganda</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMR</td>
<td>Crude mortality rate. Calculated as the number of deaths per 10,000 of population per day.</td>
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<td>CSOPNU</td>
<td>Civil Society Organisations for Peace in Northern Uganda. Coalition of over 50 NGOs advocating for peace and humanitarian protection in northern Uganda.</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross domestic product</td>
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<tr>
<td>GoS</td>
<td>Government of Sudan</td>
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<tr>
<td>GoU</td>
<td>Government of Uganda</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICC</td>
<td>International Criminal Court. Based in The Hague, and empowered by the Rome Statute, the ICC is the court that has jurisdiction over the most serious crimes of international law, namely genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression.</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally displaced person or people</td>
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<td>LDU</td>
<td>Local Defence Unit. Local civil volunteer forces trained and armed by the UPDF and tasked with the protection of IDP camps from LRA attacks.</td>
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<tr>
<td>MONUC</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>NRA</td>
<td>National Resistance Army; armed rebel group led by Yoweri Museveni, which from 1981 fought against the regimes of Milton Obote and Tito Okello. The NRA seized control of the state in January 1986.</td>
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<tr>
<td>NRM</td>
<td>National Resistance Movement. Political arm of the NRA. Assumed government over Uganda in 1986, introducing the ‘no-party’ system of government, which in 2006 will give way to multiparty politics.</td>
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<tr>
<td>NUSAF</td>
<td>Northern Uganda Social Action Fund. A $100m fund granted to the GoU by the World Bank for post-war reconstruction in northern Uganda.</td>
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<tr>
<td>OIF</td>
<td>Operation Iron Fist. Military campaign launched in 2002 by the UPDF with the intention of destroying the LRA militarily in southern Sudan. Still operational.</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAF</td>
<td>Sudan Armed Forces</td>
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<td>SPLA</td>
<td>Sudan People’s Liberation Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>USs</td>
<td>Children under the age of five.</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s’ Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNLA</td>
<td>Uganda National Liberation Army. The Ugandan national army directly prior to 1986, during the regimes of Milton Obote and Tito Okello.</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMIS</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>UPDA</td>
<td>Uganda People’s Democratic Army. Armed rebel group from northern Uganda, which fought against the NRA from 1986-88. Largely made up of troops from the defeated UNLA.</td>
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<tr>
<td>UPDF</td>
<td>Uganda People's Defence Force. The Ugandan national army.</td>
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<tr>
<td>UPE</td>
<td>Universal Primary Education. Ugandan national policy which guarantees all children a free primary education.</td>
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<tr>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
</tr>
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Notes

2 The last multi-party elections to be held in Uganda took place in 1980, and were won by Dr. Milton Obote of the Uganda People’s Congress (UPC), in what was widely acknowledged to be a rigged ballot.
7 Ibid.
Statement made by United Nations Under Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Co-ordinator, Mr. Jan Egeland, during his visit to Uganda in November 2003.

Area and Population of Countries -mid 2005 estimates
http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0004379.html


Acholiland has been the region most seriously affected by the northern war over the past 20 years. Comprising the districts of Gulu, Pader, and Kitgum, it is the traditional home of the Acholi people. All six of the rebel groups noted above emerged from the Acholi region. The LRA is perceived by many Ugandans, including government officials, to be an almost exclusively Acholi group.


As Sverker Finnstrom (op. cit., p.19) has pointed out, ‘dirty war’ is a term that applies extremely well to the context of northern Uganda. Carolyn Nordstrom defines ‘dirty war’ as that kind of war in which ‘states and guerrilla forces use the construction of terror and the absurd as a mechanism for gaining or maintaining socio-political control over a population’. Under such a strategy,

The LRA and its predecessors (see note 16) have been committing violence against civilians since 1988. However it was only in 1994 that the LRA began a systematic campaign of attacks on civilian targets, following the collapse of peace negotiations with the government, and after President Museveni delivered a seven-day ultimatum to the LRA negotiators to surrender the LRA began what appeared to be a systematic campaign of attacks on civilian targets See CSOPNU (2004) Nowhere to Hide: Humanitarian Protection Threats in Northern Uganda, p.52. CSOPNU: Kampala.


Following the January 1997 massacres, 62,000 people spontaneously moved into six camps in Kitgum district. The vast majority of these people have never returned home.

President Museveni formally announced this policy on 27 September 1996. In October, 300,000 people were forcibly displaced by the UPDF in Gulu district. See Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative (2001), op. cit., and Finnstrom, S., op. cit., p.194 for more details. For discussions of the controversy regarding the legality of the camps, see Amnesty International (1999) Breaking the Circle: Protecting human rights in the northern war zone. Amnesty International Report, AFR 59/01/99; Finnstrom, S., op. cit., p.192ff.; and CSOPNU, op. cit., pp.63-104.

Prunier, G. (2004) ‘Rebel movements and proxy warfare: Uganda, Sudan, and the Congo (1986-99)’, African Affairs, 103. 412: 359. Uganda was similarly engaged in its own proxy war with Sudan and provided significant levels of military and financial support to the SPLM/A. While the GoS now denies any link with the LRA, anecdotal reports from the Sudan and from formerly abducted children indicate that the LRA continues to receive some form of support from members of the Sudanese army from time to time. There is no clear evidence that such support is provided with the formal support of the GoS.

On 3 October 2002 the GoU issued a 48-hour displacement order for all communities in Acholiland via radio and letter, claiming that displacement was in the best interests of the civilian population, that their security could only be guaranteed if they congregated in single locations to which UPDF troops could be deployed, and that they would be bombed in their homes if they remained in


30 As noted by representatives of UNOCHA at a workshop on the ‘Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict’ held at the International Convention Centre in Kampala on 7-8 September 2004.


35 UNOCHA (2005), op. cit.


38 Ibid., p.19.


40 For instance, Pabbo in Gulu district and Patongo in Pader district.

41 Such as in Labuje Layamo, Kitgum district.

42 For instance, the population density in Mathare, one of Nairobi’s worst slum settlements, is 1,300 people per hectare. Cited in C.M. Kusienya (2004) The Mathare 4a Experience And The Kenya Slum Upgrading Programme, paper presented during a workshop on ‘The Perpetuating Challenge Of Informal Settlements’ at the University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa, 8-10 November 2004.

43 At the end of 2005 the FAFO survey (Bøås and Hatløy) estimated that there were on average three people per hut in these camps, though the UN has placed its estimate of congestion higher, at five people per hut. Observations by Oxfam staff, however, have noted households with up to 10 people sharing a hut.

44 Based upon figures presented in Republic of Uganda, Ministry of Health/World Health Organization, op. cit. CMR for Acholi is based upon a population of 1,191,000 people over 209 days.


47 The generally accepted standard for the designation of emergency health conditions is 1.0 deaths per 10,000 per day.


50 Ibid., p.4. In December 2005 the GoU announced plans to begin the resettlement of 700,000 people in their original homes. According to this official GoU letter, these IDPs will be resettled ‘on the recommendation of their elected local leadership and government’. No indication is made of whether or not the IDPs themselves are ready or willing to move.


52 Based on their survey of war-related mortality in Iraq before and after the Allied invasion, Roberts, L. et al. provide statistics that give a violent mortality
rate of 0.052/10,000 people/day, based upon a report of 21 violent deaths in a population of 7,868 over 513 days. See Roberts, L. et al. (2004) ‘Mortality before and after the 2003 invasion of Iraq: cluster sample survey’ The Lancet, Vol. 364, Issue. 9448, 20 November, p.1857-64. http://iraqbodycount.net provides a much more conservative estimate, estimating in the week of 18 January 2005 a maximum of 31,657 violent deaths in Iraq over a period of 1,111 days, giving an average of 28.4 per day, which for a population of 27 million gives a violent death rate of about 0.01/10,000 people/day.

53 Formally, LDUs are a force adjunct to the police, usually made up of locally recruited volunteers, whose role it is to support the police in providing security for life and property in the specific area in which they live.


55 Excess mortality refers to all deaths that would not have occurred under normal, non-crisis circumstances. The rate of excess mortality is derived by subtracting the estimated non-crisis baseline mortality rate from the actual mortality rate. In the case of the survey referred to here, the non-crisis baseline was the Ugandan national CMR of 0.46 deaths per 10,000 people per day.

56 Another recent survey undertaken by the Ugandan Ministry of Health reported HIV sero-prevalence rates of 9.1 per cent for northern Uganda, compared with rates of 7 per cent for the country as a whole. See Republic of Uganda, Ministry of Health (2005) Uganda HIV Sero-prevalence and Behavioural Survey.

57 Two lango is the local name given to a complex of symptoms which generally include diarrhoea, fever, and oral-anal thrush. It is highly likely that this condition is closely related to poor hygiene conditions and a lack of clean water, and may also be associated with HIV/AIDS.

58 The CMR for U5s was calculated at 3.18/10,000/day. The expected non-crisis rate is 1.14. The national average is 0.98. Republic of Uganda, Ministry of Health/World Health Organization (2005), op. cit.


60 Boås, M. and Hatløy, A., op. cit.

61 Since late 2002 the UPDF has enforced strict security regulations in all IDP camps. These regulations restrict the mobility of civilians around the camps, often restricting access to major roads, or to areas within a 2km radius of the camp. Those found cultivating crops, or collecting water or firewood beyond these bounds, are considered to be in breach of these regulations and are often arrested, beaten, or killed by the UPDF.


Rates of abduction vary greatly depending upon the season and the levels of activity of the LRA. UNICEF reported 12,000 child abductions in the period June 2002 to October 2004 alone — a rate of about 460 per month. It is necessary to remember two key points when considering these data: 1) figures relating to child abduction do not include the significant numbers of adults who are also abducted, and 2) these figures do not take into account the large numbers of children who are released by, escape from, or are rescued from the LRA.

The number of night-commuters active on any given night varies depending upon the security situation. For instance, in its CAP appeal report for 2006, UNOCHA reported night-commuter figures of 44,000 in August 2004 and 36,000 in August 2005. UNOCHA (2005), op. cit., p.19.


As a small example, the following attacks on INGOs occurred in September 2002. 4 September: ACORD vehicle ambushed and burned on Gulu/Kitgum road; 6 September: WFP truck ambushed and burned in Lapul; 10 September: WFP trucks attacked and burned on Lira/Kitgum road; 14 September: WFP convoy attacked on Puranga Rackoko road, one driver killed.

For instance, in 2002 Oxfam GB was forced to evacuate staff members from its office in Kitgum for two months. When it resumed programming in January 2003, the NGO was forced to design an innovative ‘remote implementation’ strategy to allow it to continue its work with distant IDP camps. Between that time and mid-2005, insecurity restricted Oxfam GB staff to the confines of Kitgum town and forced the agency to ban all road travel for staff members in the Acholi region.

Based on figures from the CSOPNU study. We have taken the base figure of $1.33bn and used CSOPNU’s assumption of an average 14.7 per cent increase in costs per year. Given the rapid scale of increase not only in the levels of displacement, but also in levels of violence, morbidity, mortality, and military expenditure over the past three years, the actual rate of increase is likely to be much higher than this estimate.

The UK’s bilateral gross public expenditure on aid to Uganda between 1994 and 2001 was £516.48m. Calculated from figures provided at http://www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/sid2005/contents.asp by the Department for International Development, Table 3.2 Total bilateral gross public expenditure on aid (GPEX) by main recipient countries and regions.


Calculations based upon figure available in Republic of Uganda, Department of Water Development, Summary Of Rural Water Supply And Sanitation Investments – Selected Information – 95% Coverage.

The USA’s average annual economic assistance to Uganda (loans and grants) between 1997 and 2003 was $100.7m per year. Source: US Overseas Loans and Grants [Greenbook] http://www.usaid.gov

The UK’s average annual bilateral gross public expenditure on aid to Uganda in 1994–2004 was £62.61m. Calculated from figures provided at http://www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/sid2005/contents.asp by the Department for International Development, Table 3.2 Total bilateral gross public expenditure on aid (GPEX) by main recipient countries and regions.


The extremely poor may be defined as those living with a per capita consumption of less than $0.75 per day. Absolute poverty, as defined in 1972 by Robert McNamara, is ‘a condition of life so degraded by disease, illiteracy, malnutrition, and squalor as to deny its victims basic human necessities’. Cited in Meier, G. (1995) Leading Issues in Economic Development. Sixth Edition, p.28. OUP: Oxford.
For instance, international donors have consistently underfunded the UN’s Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP). Since 1999 the CAP has been underfunded as follows: 1999: 88 per cent; 2000: 40 per cent; 2001: 56 per cent; 2002: 53 per cent; 2003: 27 per cent; 2004: 27 per cent; 2005: 35 per cent.