THE ECONOMIC UNDERPINNINGS OF HONOR CRIMES IN JORDAN

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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

CEDAW – Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women

DFP – Department of Family Planning

DHS – Department of Statistics, National Population and Family Health Survey

DSS – The Department of Social Services

FPD – Family Protection Department

ILO – International Labor Organization

IRC – Information and Research Center

JSCR – Jordan Center for Social Research

JWU – Jordanian Women’s Union

MACDERA – Mafraq Center for Development, Economic Research and Analysis

MENA – Middle East and North Africa

MSD – Ministry of Social Development

NGO – Non-Governmental Organization

UNIFEM – United Nations Development Fund For Women
ANNALS OF THE CRIMES

The following are excerpts from Rana Husseini (2009) on crimes of ‘honor’ that occurred in Jordan from the beginning of 2009 and through to September 2009.

January 21, 2009:
A 17-year-old youth from Zarqa reportedly confessed to trampling and stabbing his 13-year-old sister to death after hearing from his friends that a man gave her his phone number.

January 25, 2009:
A man was charged with the manslaughter of his younger divorced sister, 19, after shooting her to death due to accusations by her ex-husband that ‘she had a bad reputation’.

February 12, 2009:
A 20-year-old man was charged with the premeditated murder of his older sister after he reportedly stabbed her 10 times for ‘suspicious behavior’, although he admitted to having found nothing to implicate any wrongdoing.

February 2009:
A man was murdered in Zarqa for reasons related to family honor. No details were released by officials regarding the circumstances surrounding his death.

February 2009:
A 19-year-old man turned himself in after reportedly torturing, strangling and stabbing his older sister, a 22-year-old university student, because he ‘suspected’ her behavior.

February 26, 2009:
A 16-year-old reportedly strangled his 25-year-old divorced sister with the cord of a mobile charger because her family claimed that she was seen with a male stranger.

March 22, 2009:
A father and his two teenage sons were charged with premeditated murder in connection with the beating to death of their female relative due to her lying about her whereabouts and being caught by her uncle wearing make-up.

April 6, 2009:
An 18-year-old suspect reportedly confessed to stabbing his 21-year-old sister to death for leaving the family home for an unknown destination shortly after she was released from the Governor’s office.
April 11, 2009:
A 24-year-old man was charged with the premeditated murder of his 29-year-old married sister after reportedly stabbing her to death with a meat cleaver and kitchen knife while she slept at her family’s house. The reason was for ‘going out with men’.

May 10, 2009:
A 30-year-old mother of six was stabbed to death with a switch blade reportedly by her brothers, aged 44 and 19, after she had been missing from her husband’s house for ten hours.

July 9, 2009:
A 24-year-old farmer was charged with stabbing his pregnant sister 10 times in front of a crowd because he was told that she was having an affair.

July 20, 2009:
A 20-year-old man stabbed his married sister 20 times and bashed her head with a rock after accusing her of ‘immoral behavior’ in a Amman suburb. The woman had left her family home one month before the incident and was found by police in an apartment with another man.

August 11, 2009:
A 16-year-old victim of incestuous rape was shot nine times in the head and back by her uncle while at her father’s home in a Amman suburb. The uncle claimed ‘family honor’ as his motive.

August 13, 2009:
A 28-year-old woman was shot and killed by her 20-year-old brother as she left a wedding because her family disapproved of her husband to whom she had been married for two years.

August 26, 2009:
A 17-year-old girl died nine days after her throat was slit by her brother in the Jordan Valley, and who reportedly also stabbed her several times to cleanse the family honor. The 24-year-old farmer claimed he was 100 percent certain she was involved in an affair.

September 8, 2009:
A young man in Aqaba confessed to killing his sister due to her ‘immoral behavior’.
INTRODUCTION

The term ‘honor’ crimes, a grave misnomer in light of its tragic outcomes, has largely become synonymous with the murder of women – mostly young women. The act of an ‘honor’ killing, aided by loopholes in a penal system dating back to the 18th century, mostly takes place within sections of society where a restrictive definition of morality has been adopted and where men take it upon themselves to punish ‘errant’ women within their families.

The men who murder their female relatives feel that their actions are sanctioned and therefore should go unpunished. Sections of society not only accept the crime as an honorable deed, but more worryingly, they pressure, shun, ostracize and force families within their fold to murder their daughters, sisters, mothers and female cousins.

The Information and Research Center (IRC) started looking at the cases of female killings in Jordan in 2002 when it conducted an extensive study for UNIFEM and came across shocking indicators of the prevalence of violence against women in Jordan from male members of the family. A significant number of these murders were claimed as ‘honor’ crimes where women were accused of immoral behavior and the men who killed them received reduced prison sentences of no longer than six months in most cases.

Meanwhile, both Dr. Yusuf Mansur of the Mafraq Center for Development, Economic Research and Analysis (MACDERA) and Dr. Musa Shteiwi of the Jordan Center for Social Research have had ‘the conversation’ about whether these crimes could be studied against a formula of poverty indicators. They questioned whether ‘honor’ becomes much more valuable among communities and families which have very little else to boast about. Could it be argued that women who are uneducated, unemployed, unmarried and living in a poor area are ‘cheaper’ to kill than perhaps educated, employed and married women even if they had committed a sin? Could it be that under-age, uneducated, unemployed and unmarried young men are less costly to use as perpetrators of the murder than the head of the family who, if incarcerated, would ‘cost’ the family much more.

Dr. Mansur, an economist who applies economics to a wide spectrum of social issues, believed that there was a direct link between poverty and so-called honor crimes that must be studied. Meanwhile, Dr. Shteiwi, a sociologist and gender specialist, argued for the importance of pressures from society, the historical tie between women’s behavior and the family honor in the Middle East. The IRC joined ranks with these two prominent individuals in proposing a study into the economic underpinnings of so-called honor crimes to be funded by the European
Delegation to Jordan under the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) fund. The proposal was successful and thus the effort began.

Many who had studied ‘honor’ crimes in Jordan before and/or commented on this phenomenon had recommended changes in the laws of the country to close all loopholes and make the crime more ‘expensive’ for the perpetrator. Many have also advocated and lobbied for awareness campaigns to change the mindset of Jordanians not only towards so-called honor crimes but more importantly to the concept of honor itself and its perplexing link to the behavior of a female relative rather than being a measure of the behavior of the individual. These efforts pioneered the campaign in Jordan to eradicate the incidence of so-called honor crimes and provide the background for this study.

The authors of this study do not claim that every murder is due to poverty nor do they claim that every victim is economically powerless. What the study clearly indicates is that alongside the complicated analysis of the society’s perception of family honor, role of women and morality, there is a clear line that leads us directly to economics and even more directly to well-known poverty indicators. If the study could make a new and unique recommendation to policy makers today then it would recommend that the government pay attention to the economic empowerment of women to increase not only women’s social value but also their monetary worth. This means the government needs to pay attention to creating work opportunities and providing equal pay and benefits for women. This economic push to empower women must come hand in hand with all the necessary steps and existing recommendations to put in place all the necessary mechanisms to provide protection for women in Jordan as well as safe shelter and opportunity for women who need it.

I had the honor of working with two very noteworthy and prominent partners as well as head a very impressive research team at the IRC which worked diligently to collect and authenticate all the data for this paper despite logistical complications, traumatic and emotional conditions during interviews with perpetrators in prisons as well as a demanding schedule for quality and delivery. This study is a contribution to gender research in Jordan in the hope that it will contribute in turn to the improvement of conditions for women both here and wherever such crimes are committed against women in the name of honor.

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A SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE ON HONOR CRIMES

Arab Women in Historical Narratives

The historical narrative of urban and rural Arab women across the centuries is rarely homogeneous. Despite a common thread in language and religion in the MENA region, historians, particularly female Arab historians, have unveiled a divergent historical picture of Arab women’s responses to a world largely constructed and instituted by an inflexible patriarchal order.

Arab feminist and postmodern studies in the past three decades have focused as much on space, sexuality and sanctuaries as they have on rebellious ideologies, nationalist and political prowess, and on discourses of women, history and Islamic culture. The participation of Arab women in public spaces is manifested in or often motivates the narratives of both traditional and postmodern, post-Orientalist historical narratives. What unites and underlies the premise of all these works is that whether urban or rural, Arab women across the centuries ventured out into male-dominated spaces to assert their presence or, more importantly, to secure their survival.

The tools of social analysis today have focused on the past decade’s highly publicized issue in Jordan of so-called honor crimes. Few studies convincingly specify the origins of this crime; many attribute it to an entrenched patriarchal culture that has recently witnessed massive social and economic upheaval. That Arab women have traditionally been ascribed roles within a rigid patriarchal system of beliefs across the centuries, and that these roles are often inextricably, though erroneously, linked to religious doctrine forms the weight of argument against so-called honor crimes.

Popular arguments point to the origins of the pre-Islamic era in the MENA region where female infanticide was commonplace. Prior to the arrival of Islam in AD 622, impoverished Bedouin Arabs living in strife-ridden areas customarily buried alive their newly born female infants. The crime was committed by the father of the child for fear of poverty as women were perceived as being unable to contribute to protecting the family and tribe.

While Islam explicitly banned this custom, clearly stating in the Qur’an that such acts were committed for fear of poverty, the decline of the enlightenment in the Arab world may have led to a tightening of a patriarchal tribal culture in which values and customs demanded that
men protect their ‘honor’. With women under the protection of men, honor necessarily included women’s actions and behavior, particularly, according to Albert Hourani (1991), such action or behavior ‘that might challenge the social order’.

Hourani (1991) notes that with much of the essential sources lacking, the pre-Ottoman rural culture of the region can only be surmised. ‘On this assumption’, he says, ‘it is possible to say that … it was part of a man’s honor to defend what was his … the women of his family … were under his protection, but what they did could affect his honor: a lack of modesty, or behavior which would arouse in men who had no claims over them strong feelings…’

Women in the medieval cities of this region fared no better. Segregation was the norm (Hourani, 1991) but texts describing the medieval Islamic period often point to a hub of economic and social activity taking place behind the walls (Ahmed, 1992). That is not to say that women’s lives were not subjugated or oppressed, but with no written records by women of that time, significant details of their lives may never be known (Ahmed, 1992; Hourani, 1991).

In more recent times, Western colonial encroachment and with it legal reforms seemed to have had little impact on women outside the urban bourgeoisie (Ahmed, 1992). If anything, legal reforms handed down from penal codes established in the 18th century1 when Europe was itself dominated by a misogynistic culture, have provided Arab women with precious little comfort.

The Concept of Honor

In the typical scenario of an ‘honor’ crime, one washes or cleanses his honor from shame by shedding the blood of a relative; the person murdered is, in most instances, a woman; the murderer is typically a male relative; and the punishment of the male is typically minimal. In most cases, the murderer is revered in his social circles as an ‘honorable’ man.

The concept of honor within these so-called honor crimes is largely rooted in kinship relations. Blood relations, especially in the region are a consistent concept and persist throughout a person’s life. For women, this means that even when they marry into a different family, they maintain their membership to their paternal family. This continued connection has positive implications for women especially when circumstances are difficult, and where she can always depend on the support and sympathy of her father and brothers. Knowledge of that support for women places some restrictions on the way that a husband and his family can treat the wife. In most cases, this effectively prevents the negative treatment of the wife.

1See section: Jurisprudence and the Legal Aspect of Honor Crimes, p25.
The continuation of the responsibility of the paternal family towards the behavior of their married daughter, however, becomes more salient if a woman is deemed guilty of a misdemeanor that violates the traditional ethical code of conduct of the group.

In the event that a woman is perceived to have acted against the traditional ethical code, it is the patrilineal family, not the woman, on whom ‘honor’ is lost. According to widespread cultural values, it is possible to reclaim or repair family honor by punishing the woman. In conservative families, this reparation may translate into ending her life.

The concept of honor is linked to the reputation or the social standing of the family in the community in which they live. To maintain good social standing in the community, the family has either to preserve the family honor or restore it in case it is lost or violated.

The insistence on punishing women by members of her original family and not by her husband’s (if she is married) functions to conserve cohesion among family members and to ensure control of the family on its members. The alternative, which is to grant punishing rights to the husband, gives control over a family member who is, in effect, an outsider, allowing for a weakened solidarity among the family.

The strongest deterrent designated in the traditional Jordanian and Arab culture against illicit sexual behavior (sexual acts between a woman and a man outside marriage) is the equation between the honor of the family and the sexual activity or behavior of women in the family. This ‘honor’, however, distinguishes itself from the more specific notion of women’s sexual integrity, namely, ird.

**Administrative Protection**

Jordan is divided into twelve administrative districts, each headed by a governor who is subject to the Interior Ministry, but exercises wide authority within his district. A governor may, without process or review, detain and imprison any person for public safety. When confronted with a woman who has no safe place to escape her angry relatives and who has been referred to the governor by the police, an administrative governor often exercises his power to send her to prison for her own protection.

There are no accurate statistics on how many women live in prison in Jordan today for ‘their own protection’. A woman incarcerated on the order of an administrative governor may be released only with his consent. As a matter of custom and practice, such consent is given only when he deems it safe for her to leave and when a male family member commits himself to be responsible for her. The irony of this situation becomes apparent when the male member responsible, the male who can obtain her release, is often the potential perpetrator the woman was seeking to escape.
The Concept of *Ird*

The concept of honor that is linked to the sexual conduct of women is linguistically differentiated from other spheres of shame and honor that are manifested. In the case of non-sexual behavior, the general term is ‘honor’ but in reference to honor linked to women and their sexual behavior, the term is *ird*.

‘Honor’ is a flexible term and includes male conduct such as public speech and social behavior. ‘Honor’ can be obtained, limited, lost and reclaimed again. *Ird*, the term used to denote a non-retrievable honor connected to a woman’s sexual behavior, is an absolute. Each woman inherits her *ird*; that is, she is born with it and it cannot be fragmented.

*Ird* is women’s duty to guard, protect and conserve. Consequently, any sexual conduct or behavior on the part of women regardless how small or limited it may be, results in the loss of *ird* and once lost, like virginity, it is almost impossible to reclaim. Virginity and *ird* become organic parts of the female person that cannot be partitioned or fragmented and can only be lost once and never repaired or regained. Virginity and *ird* share another trait: in the case of sexual assault or rape, women lose their virginity as well as their *ird*.

What makes things more complicated is that the honor of the man and the family is almost totally dependent on the *ird* of the females in the family. Men can lose their honor by not displaying courage, hospitality or generosity, and are socialized from early on to at least preserve the appearances of masculine behavior and generosity. Loss of this type of honor is not linked to an institutionalized or physical punishment. Nor is there any agreement on whether crimes of an ethical nature such as theft, bribery or lying affect male honor.

The essence of honor related to women’s sexual activity is therefore the preservation and protection of *ird*. In all cases, not protecting *ird* is the only crime that leads to the death of women at the hands of her family in Jordan and many Arab countries.
Public Services

The Department of Social Services (DSS), which comes under the Ministry of Social Development (MSD), offers counseling for family reconciliation. For many, this can only mean marriage: if the man who is linked to the illicit behavior (or any other man) can and will marry the woman, the problem may be regarded as solved. Counselors may also try to find someone in the family to diffuse the threat and work toward a solution short of marriage. However, reconciliation is rarely successful. Social attitudes are entrenched and counselors are in short supply in Jordan. The DSS has few psychologists; the Jordanian Women’s Union (JWU) has only one, and other private groups are similarly understaffed.

It is widely and mistakenly believed that crimes of honor are only those that result in the death of the woman. In fact, crimes of honor include a wider spectrum of physical and emotional violence against women such as deprivation and isolation, battering, burning and acid throwing which never make it to the news media. Crimes of ‘honor’ should not be considered as isolated incidents that happen to few women in the country. The reported crimes of ‘honor’ might only represent the tip of the iceberg of the overall violence against women. Therefore, crimes of ‘honor’ have to be understood in the context of the overall gender-based violence inflicted upon women in Jordanian society.

According to Family Protection Department (FPD) statistics, the numbers of cases of violence against women increased by 303% between 2004 and 2008. The largest increase took place between 2006 and 2008 (166% and 146% respectively). The FPD has dealt with more than 400 cases of sexual assault against women annually since 2004 with the exception of 2006 where they dealt with just under 800 cases. Depending on their severity, these cases are either handled at FPD or transferred to the governor or referred to the MSD.

The MSD dealt with 1200 cases of violence in 2006 alone. The National Center for Forensic Medicine deals with more than 700 cases of sexual violence against women annually. The National Center for Human Rights deals with over 200 cases of violence against women annually. The cases that reach the above and other institutions are the severe cases and are mostly cases able to access these institutions. However, and
as data from national surveys indicate, the level of violence against women is much higher than these figures would indicate.

In the Department of Statistics, National Population and Family Health Survey (DHS) for 2007, it was revealed that one third of married women between the ages of 15 and 49 were subjected to physical and sexual violence after they reached the age of 15 years, while 13% said that they were subject to physical and sexual violence the year preceding the survey. The results also reveal that 5% of all pregnant women have been subject to physical violence at least once in the year preceding the survey.

The results of the DHS survey are supported by the results of the two national surveys (baseline, 2007 and follow-up 2008) that were conducted by the Jordan Center for Social Research (JCSR). According to the JCSR, in 2007 more than 60% of the women were subjected to one form of violence (at least once in the year preceding the survey). The types of abuse include physical, mental and sexual violence.

In 2009, the percentage of women who were subjected to violence was more than 37% which was significantly down from the 2007 figures. This sharp decline is partially explained by changes in the questions. In both surveys, physical violence was just below half of all types of violence and it included beating, kicking, shoving, and threatening. What is interesting in the 2009 survey is the emergence of economic violence such as denial of inheritance and control over women’s incomes. In both surveys, the primary perpetrators of violence against women are in the following order: the husband, the father and the brother.

The surveys also reveal other important aspects about issues relating to violence such as the knowledge of the availability of organizations that provide support to abused women, reasons behind not informing authorities about violence or abuse of women, and perceptions of the right of men to use physical violence against women in certain situations.

Fear of family break-ups, damage to family reputation, and difficulty in abandoning their children in case of divorce are the main reasons behind women not reporting cases of violence against them.
Honor, Ird and Social Change

The concepts of honor and *ird* are not constant. They are affected by the level of socio-economic development and structure of the society. *Ird* is more common in small-scale communities such as villages and tribal associations than in cities. However prevalent they may be in such communal arrangements, their occurrence is rare due to strong social control mechanisms that exist in society. Jordanian society has witnessed large-scale and significant social, economic, and political changes that might have affected these cultural norms. These changes might not have radically altered the concept of honor, but they did have an impact on its manifestation within communities and individuals. The list of effects is long, but the focus here will be on Islamic interpretations, urbanization, education, women’s public participation, and the information revolution.

‘Honor’ Crimes and Islam

Due to the fact that ‘honor’ crimes occur mostly in Arab and Muslim countries, a common mistaken assumption is that Islam sanctions crimes of ‘honor’. However, ‘honor’ crimes are not mentioned in any religious texts. The system of penalty in Islam is very clear on this and the only related forbidden crime according to Shari’a law is *zina* (adultery).

Determining whether *zina* has been committed, however, requires the production of evidence that is beyond any doubt. In the Qur’an and the Hadith, for the penalty to be applied and punishment to take place, an evidence of *zina* must be established. The evidence could be repeated confession by the woman or obtained from four rational witnesses who have witnessed the sexual act itself. Barring that, the Qur’an explicitly states that the woman who ‘swears four times by Allah that his charge is false and calls down His curse upon herself if it be true, she shall receive no punishment’ (24:6)². Those who falsely accuse a man or a woman of committing *zina* are, in turn, punished for having falsely accused an innocent couple (24:4)³.

Where evidence is produced, Qur’anic interpretation is that the penalty for such a crime is one hundred lashes in public for unmarried women and men, and stoning for married women and men. Islam, as the verse below indicates, punishes both men and women who commit this sin which is in contrast with the practice of ‘honor’ killings where the punishment is incurred mainly on women: ‘The adulterer and adulteress shall each be given a hundred lashes’ (24:2)⁴.

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³ Ibid.
⁴ Ibid.
Although the official position of Islam is clearly opposed to ‘honor’ crimes, this might not always be reflected by religious groups or establishments. For instance, when the motion to cancel Article 340 was sent to Parliament in 1998, the Islamic bloc voted against the motion in clear appeasement to the socially conservative society. The burden is on Islamic scholars and groups to de-Islamize the social practice of ‘honor’ crimes.

**Motivations behind ‘Honor’ Crimes**

The motivations for crimes of ‘honor’ vary. Since these crimes are related to family ‘honor’, there is no agreement as to what constitutes a violation of honor and it is left up to individuals and families to decide that. Consequently, the declared reasons for the violation of honor are many.

The journalist and author Rana Husseini has, over a period of time, documented the reasons that were given for killing the victims. The list is long and it includes rumors, suspicion, being a victim of rape, a victim of incest assaults, becoming pregnant out of wedlock, marrying a man against family wishes, financial reasons, inheritance, missing from home, talking to a stranger, caught in a brothel, and engaging in an ‘illegitimate’ or extra-marital affair.

Women have been killed on the basis of suspicion or rumors and found innocent at a later stage. An argument exists that some crimes are committed against women to cover up male family member’s misconduct, such as incest. However, it must be emphasized that inflicting capital punishment on violators is not the statistical norm. Richard Antoun (1968) notes: ‘Elopement, marriage, hushing-up of violations, compensation and banishment, or any combination thereof are usual and preferred solutions for cases of honor. Only one case recorded by me for the Ajloun district over a period of seven years resulted in the death penalty.’ (p.685)

**Signs of Change**

In a world witnessing a fast pace of change through technical and mobile communication methods, widespread change has affected even sheltered communities in urban spaces. Free access to education and public services, and women’s ability to participate in professional spheres has changed the way women perceive their roles and how they communicate.
Public Security

The Family Protection Department (FPD) was established in 1998 within the Public Security Directorate with the mandate to protect women and children from domestic violence. It was meant to establish a close working relationship between the police, social services, judiciary system, medical services, schools, NGOs and others. Although women who were threatened with death for ‘staining’ family honor were initially expected to be part of the FPD mandate, officials decided, after only two months of operation, to exclude physical abuse of adult women by a family member from its mandate.

According to an official of the FPD within the Public Security Directorate, only fifteen to twenty police officers per year receive any training on domestic violence. The training lasts only a few days, too brief to be serious, and within the program there is no material dealing specifically with ‘honor’ crimes.

Police frequently require women to be examined by a forensic doctor to determine whether their hymens are intact. Virginity exams reflect the presumption that families, communities and the state have a legitimate interest in a woman’s sexual conduct. They involve pain, humiliation and intimidation. These exams constitute cruel and inhumane treatment and are a violation of women’s rights to physical integrity, sexual autonomy and privacy.

The JCSR national survey found that only 45.4% of the respondents knew of services and places they could turn to in case of violence. Those who knew of FPD services constituted 80% of those who already knew of other services. Only 9.3% of women knew of such services offered by centers or women’s societies.

Services provided by these institutions include protection, legal support, follow-up and attempts to solve the problem according to the survey, and most are offered through police or FPD working under the supervision of the Public Security Directorate. When asked about the possibility of accessing these institutions in the case of being subject to violence, only 9% of respondents claimed they would.

Moreover, the survey pointed out that there were cases in which women would approve of men using physical violence against them. The reasons were as follows: if the wife curses her husband’s family (45%), or talks to or flirts with other men (42%). Other reasons included not obeying her husband’s orders in public, leaving home without her husband’s permission, not responding to her husband needs, not taking care of her children (between 20% to 30%).
Effects of Urbanization

The process of urbanization in Jordanian society in the last 50 years has been rapid and extensive and represents a complete shift from a rural/pastoral society to a largely urban society. Urbanization is not only a physical structure but also a way of life.

Urban space areas tend to be more compact, allowing for physical closeness and crowded public places such as streets and markets. Two significant and related aspects of urbanization are relevant to changing the concept of honor and its enforcement. These are the decline of the community (especially kinship) and the prospects of anonymity. Within a busy metropolis, people are harder to identify as individuals, too busy to develop close ties, and are more mobile geographically and socially.

This process is supported and strengthened by the shift of the family structure from the extended type of rural communities to the nuclear type that dominates urban communities. That makes it possible for men and women to break ties with extended families. Since the practice of honor is based on kinship structure in strong and small communities, the maintenance of ird and the code of modesty become more difficult to maintain.

Mobility further complicates the enforcement of ird and the public space makes interaction with strangers more likely. Male control of women is still possible, but it becomes increasingly difficult physically because it requires surveillance and observation which are more difficult to maintain in the city.

The above characterization of the urban way of life may not apply to all urban centers or cities in Jordan for several reasons. Many of the urban centers in Jordan are small or medium-sized cities that have grown out of small villages or localities with the same original population growing in size. This implies that traditional family and kinship structures continue to maintain a strong presence in spite of urban expansion.

In fact, many of the urban localities today are composed of one or two large tribes. The implications are that the urban way of life is weak and the possibility of the maintenance of the traditional notion of honor is strong in many instances.

Urbanization in Jordan is strongly influenced not only by the expansion of urban economy and activities, but also by the rural to urban migration. Urban centers have grown due to the forced migration of hundreds of thousands of Palestinian refugees with a majority from rural backgrounds. In both cases of migration, people tended to settle in the same areas as kinship groups and tribes. Their communities were structured largely around the same pre-migration social structures. This has resulted in
what Halim Barakat (2000) called the ‘ruralization of the city’. The result of this process is that traditional communities and values continue to flourish in the cities. Certainly, large cities like Amman have witnessed significant mobility, but the traditional structure and arrangements continue to exist, especially in poor and crowded areas of the city.

**Education**

Education is another force of change in the attitudes and values of Jordanian families and society. The development and expansion of education has been dramatic in the last few decades. Education indicators in Jordan are among the best in the region at all levels of education, with enrolment rates very high for both males and females. The high enrolment rates for females are especially important because they signal a change of attitude among families with regards to the roles of women in the society. The expansion of education, especially at secondary and university levels, reduces the ability to control women and potentially weakens the ird code in society. The education of women further allows for the assignment of roles that go beyond the traditional ones of childbearing and child rearing.

**Women’s Participation in Public Life**

Jordanian women have made significant strides in their status and participation in public life. Women’s participation in the economy is more than 13% and women work in almost all fields of occupations that have traditionally been dominated by men. Women have also entered the realm of politics in elected bodies at national as well as local levels, or in appointed positions in government.

Women’s economic participation and their education have helped empower women economically and socially, increasing their status and importance within their own families as well as their communities. Women have also become more independent and knowledgeable which have helped change the perception of women’s traditional roles.

**The Information and Communication Revolution**

Jordan, like many countries in the region, has taken significant steps towards entering the information age. Internet access, the prevalence of personal computers and mobile phones are within reach for a large number of Jordanians, especially the young.

Internet penetration in Jordan is 36%, one third of which are females (Irex, 2009). The internet and mobile phones have significantly altered the social patterns of interaction between men and women and have provided an interaction medium that is outside the control of family members, especially the males. It has allowed women to communicate freely with men and to build networks with people outside the family.
Also, the internet has empowered women by allowing them access to news, ideas, values and other cultural aspects. In sum, the internet and mobile phones have had a liberating and empowering effect on men and women, altering the rigid and traditional concept of the culture of honor.

**Jurisprudence and the Legal Aspect of ‘Honor’ Crimes**

Crimes of ‘honor’ are legitimized de facto by Article 340 (No.16, 1960) of the Jordanian Penal Code, which dates back to Article 188 of the Ottoman Code which is in turn based on Article 324 of the French Code of 1881.

The code states that ‘he who discovers his wife or one of his female relatives committing adultery and kills, wounds, or injures one of them, is exempted from any penalty’. The article is frequently used in defense of ‘honor’ killings despite the common understanding that Article 340, as it stands, does not conform to Islamic law. Jordanian officials and Islamists have both stated that Islam does not authorize a male family member to carry out punishment on a supposedly errant female relative.

In communities where perpetrators of this crime are prosecuted, teenage brothers are encouraged to kill their sisters because the consequences will be less severe due to the age factor. If an adult is prosecuted, Article 98 of the Penal Code can be invoked, which states: ‘He who commits a crime in a fit of fury, caused by an improper and dangerous act on the part of the victims, benefits from a reduction of penalty.’ Thus, only men can benefit from the reduction of penalty or total exemption; women in an identical situation are not entitled to same consideration.

Several legislative efforts have been made to address Article 340. In 1999, a special committee was established to review and amend gender-discriminatory laws. After the committee recommended the repeal of Article 340, and the Council of Ministers approved the recommendation, it was presented to Parliament twice, in November 1999 and January 2000. In both cases, though approved by the Royal Palace-appointed Upper House of Parliament, it failed to pass the elected House of Representatives.

In mid-2001, while the Lower House of Parliament was temporarily suspended, the Cabinet passed a number of ‘temporary’ laws subject to parliamentary ratification once the new legislature convened. Among the ‘temporary’ laws were several granting equal rights to women on issues such as nationality, passports and retirement. In the case of Article 340, the ‘temporary’ law amended rather than repealed the Article: husbands would no longer be exonerated for murdering suspect women.

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wives; instead, the circumstances would be considered as evidence for mitigating punishment, along the lines of Article 98. In an apparent effort to mollify proponents of repeal, the mitigation was extended to women as well as men.

In September 2003, Parliament went into session with the amended Article 340 on its agenda for ratification. The Upper House twice approved the proposals, which were subsequently rejected by the Lower House again. Currently, the changes in this law – and all the other ‘temporary’ laws improving women’s status – remain pending.

The second-class status of women in Jordan, as in many other countries, puts them at risk for domestic violence, to varying degrees of severity. While some women in abusive relationships seek help from hotlines when available and would leave home if they could, most fear reprisals and have no safe place to go.

According to UNIFEM’s annual report on the status of Jordanian women, financial burdens and difficult economic conditions are one of the main explanations for violence. Heads of household, the report proclaims, often direct their financial frustrations at their families. The report asserts that unemployment, even if short-term, plays a very important role in creating this phenomenon of brutal murder.

Studies by Jordanian sociologists and social work professionals emphasize that domestic violence cuts across socio-economic lines. However, most ‘honor’ crimes in Jordan are committed in economically disenfranchised, poverty-stricken areas. Among the poor in Jordan, domestic violence turns to ‘honor’ killings as the term ‘honor’ has widened far beyond defiance of sexual norms to encompass perceived defiance of social norms by women. These include the right to education or work in certain communities, thus subjugating women in most aspects of life through the ever-widening concept of honor.

According to official figures in Jordan, 102 people were killed during the period between 2000 and 2008 with the vast majority (91) being women in incidents related to honor. However, independent groups stress that this number is much greater because such killings often take place in rural and Bedouin areas and are concealed by the family group to avoid social scandals. Moreover, numerous murders against women, when reported, are ruled as accidents, suicides or family disputes. The final judgment on whether a killing is classified as an ‘honor’ killing is in the hands of the judiciary. Police and officials, primarily due to biased legislation and pressured by cultural norms and values, are often easily swayed from proper investigations and fitting verdicts. Even when a crime is proved to have occurred, the punishment is usually only a few months of incarceration.

In an interview for UNICEF’s Mother and Child publication, Sabri
Rubeihat, sociologist at the University of Jordan at the time, stated that Jordan still views itself as a communal or tribal society. Therefore, he added, there is no official system for handling or reporting family violence or for protecting the victim during the investigation; and that reporting the violence or police intervention may worsen the situation.\(^6\)

Nor does the public hear of these horrific crimes. ‘Honor’ crimes receive sporadic and often superficial journalistic exposure, mainly as a narration of stories from the field or as coverage of the crime scene with many of the details left untold; loose or muted documentation of the cases are reported in intermittent intervals that vary in quality and coverage depending upon the modus operandi of the time.

In the late 1990s, a long public debate was held by women’s movements and human rights NGOs in an attempt to cancel Article 340 of the Jordanian Penal Code. In 1999, a grassroots campaign against the so-called honor killings created a movement that was quite unusual in Jordan. The movement was internally democratic, carefully independent of the government or any political group, and directed by women as well as men. Expounding on the Jordanian constitution, Islamic law, and international human rights principles, the campaign cut across traditional family, tribal and communal divisions within society, appealing to the morality of the nation. The campaign gathered some 15,000 signatures on a petition for the repeal of Article 340. Despite the campaign’s efforts, in a survey conducted by the Jordan Times and reported by the newspaper on November 9, 1999, 62% of Jordanians opposed amending Article 340, much less repealing it.

Official support for the campaign was non-existent: the campaigners were denied official permits to march in support of the repeal. Campaign organizers were then taken by surprise when a member of the royal family announced a march for the cause in February 2000. The march drew 5,000 people in Amman. Most of the participants were men; the women’s organizations were not informed.

Many legal experts argue that Article 340 is rarely applied to cases that are classified as crimes of honor. While this might be true, the symbolism of the law is as important as its application. One of the messages that it entails is that it is acceptable for some people to take the law into their hands and punish others without fear of punishment themselves. The other message is that the law gives men power over a broad spectrum of women: sisters, wives, nieces, mothers and female cousins. This legitimizes male control over women not only in this case but also in general.

Article 98, on the other hand, provides for reduced sentences if the perpetrator committed his crime in a state of ‘extreme rage’. Articles 99 and 100 are used in court to reduce the sentence of the perpetrator based on ‘extenuating circumstances’. For instance, when the victim’s family, which is also the perpetrator’s family, waives their personal right to litigate, courts can reduce sentences by up to half, based on ‘extenuating’ circumstances provided in Articles 99 and 100. However, those Articles say nothing about private rights, and it appears that courts have wide discretion to invoke an absence of private rights litigation in order to make a finding of extenuating circumstances warranting a reduced sentence.

Based on the criticism of these Articles and the apparent sympathy of judges and prosecutors to the family of the victim, the government of Jordan took steps to improve the situation. The judiciary has become more serious in handling these crimes. Judges have begun to pass harsher sentences, while the reduction of sentences today cannot be more than half the sentence handed out.

Constitutional Law

Jordanian law is based on French law. All murder cases are tried in the High Criminal Court which is one of Jordan’s seven Courts of First Instance. The Jordanian Constitution stipulates that all Jordanians are equal regardless of sex or origin. The Jordanian National Charter clearly states that Jordanian men and women have equal rights and obligations. With regard to the Senate, women account for 14% of current membership. Women have been represented in successive government line-ups and in senior administrative positions as secretaries-general, directors-general and ambassadors.

The government published the text of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women in the Official Gazette on

The Role of NGOs

The JWU, an independent grassroots organization, runs a crisis hotline and a small, six-bed shelter in Amman. However, it can barely meet the needs of women who are victims of domestic violence, including women who are threatened in order to ‘cleanse’ family honor. Despite repeated government promises to establish a shelter, none yet exists. Legislation to create a center for victims of domestic violence has been pending for many years, but it has been mired in much controversy, particularly over whether ‘honor’ crime victims should be included.

There is still no shelter in Jordan either for ‘honor’ crime survivors or for victims of other types of domestic violence. The legislation neither explicitly includes nor explicitly excludes honor crime victims from the population eligible for access to the shelter but as a matter of practice these victims are not expected to be included for the present.
August 1, 2007, having ratified the Convention. Therefore, the Convention has the status of law, just like any other piece of legislation in Jordan.

Jordan has also ratified the principal conventions on women’s rights, such as the Convention on the Political Rights of Women, the Convention on the Nationality of Married Women and the Convention on Consent to Marriage, the Minimum Age for Marriage and the Registration of Marriages.

The National Committee for Women Affairs was formed in 1992. It supports women, represents them in international forums and conducts studies on women’s rights. The government also amended some laws to increase guarantees of women’s participation and representation in legislative assemblies and public office. The following amendments were made:

- The Passports Act No. 5 of 2003 was amended to allow women to obtain a passport without having to go through their legal guardian.
- The clause requiring a wife to seek her husband’s permission to apply for or renew her passport was repealed.
- The Civil Status Code No. 9 of 2001 was amended to allow Jordanian women who are married to foreign men or are widowed or divorced to obtain a family book. The provision on access to passports was repealed giving women freedom to travel on their own.
- The Personal Status Code was amended to allow Jordanian women married to non-Jordanians or are widowed or divorced to obtain a family document. The Protection from Family Violence Act was adopted in May 2008. The Maintenance Credit Fund Bill was submitted to the Office of the Prime Minister.
- The text of the Labor Code supports the principle of gender equality. This means that women are entitled to all the general benefits provided for under the Code, in addition to a number of benefits and guarantees afforded to women under Arab and international labor conventions, in particular the International Labor Organization (ILO) Convention concerning Equal Remuneration for Men and Women Workers for Work of Equal Value (No. 100) of 1951 and the ILO Convention concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation (No. 111) of 1958. The benefits include: 10 weeks of paid maternity leave; breaks for breastfeeding; two years’ unpaid leave to accompany a husband who is transferred outside the region for work; the creation of in-house nurseries in workplaces with more than 20 married women employees; regulations defining the industries, occupations and hours in which women may not be employed and the exceptions to those regulations; and rules prohibiting the dismissal of a pregnant employee beginning in the sixth month of pregnancy.
There are currently more than 20 organizations that work directly or indirectly in the field of gender-based violence. Services offered by these organizations range from research to legal, social and psychological services, and hotline services. There are only two NGOs that have shelters for abused women in Jordan. The only organization that provides countrywide support for family violence and violence against women is the FPD.

Most organizations working in this field operate at the national level and there are little to no activities for these organizations at the local levels. Furthermore, local level organizations are small and lack the sufficient resources to provide adequate services. Many of these organizations deal with post-event cases of ‘honor’ crimes.

Nevertheless, awareness of violence against women and the need to combat it are growing and more organizations are directing their programs and energy to work on this issue.

**THE ECONOMICS OF ‘HONOR’ KILLINGS**

Social scientists have long studied punishment as deterrence (e.g., Beccaria 1963; Becker 1968; Bentham 1948; Piliavin et al. 1986). Criminal behavior was traditionally linked to an offender’s presumed motivation, which, in turn, was ascribed to a particular inclination such as deviations from physiological and mental health, spiritual deterioration or zealousness, or the impact of exceptional social or family circumstances – such as political and social anomalies, war conditions, the disruption of family life, dishonor – or to both (Ehrlich, 1973).

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The subject of using economic tools in the analysis of crime was first legitimized by the groundbreaking research of Gary Becker (Becker,
1968); which, based on rational choice theory, subsumes that perpetrator of a crime is a rational person who weighs prior to committing the crime, the cost and benefits from committing the crime. Since then, a number of studies using several data collection approaches have supported the central proposition of rational choice theory, that offenders weigh the costs and benefits of crime in deciding whether to offend (Bachman, Paternoster, & Ward, 1992; Bouffard, 2002a; Decker, Wright, & Logie, 1993; Exum, 2002; Grasmick & Bursik, 1990; Klepper & Nagin, 1989; Nagin & Paternoster, 1993, 1994; Paternoster & Simpson, 1996; Piliavin, Gartner, Thornton, & Matsueda, 1986; Wright & Decker, 1994)\(^7\).

Bouffard (2002) demonstrated that there was individual variability in the consequences reported as relevant to the decision. For example, less than 5% of participants reported items related to morality as a potential cost. Note that this cost type was used in several previous rational choice studies (e.g., Bachman et al., 1992). Rational choice theory too would seem to gain from recognizing the existence of individual differences in the perception of specific consequences as relevant as well as the ability to predict those differences (Pogarsky, 2002).

‘Honor’ Crimes from an Economic Perspective

The concept of honor that is used to rationalize ‘honor’ killings is based upon an entrenched belief within society that one’s honor depends on the behavior of others in order to safeguard one’s own esteem and position within society. This rationale is distinct from the view that one’s honor and esteem within the community depends totally on his or her own actions and not those of others (Baker and Cassidy, 1999).

It has been perceived that the former view is inherently more observed in patriarchal societies as the power-holding group struggles to hold onto its power in contestable arenas (Schneider, 1971). However, such a view is often taken as a blanket statement to explain ‘honor’ killings as natural product of paternalism in the Middle East. Naturally, due to the purveyance of this perception, attempts to address ‘honor’ killings as what they are – killings – have been met with resistance in the region and viewed as efforts to usurp power or change the paternalistic status quo. Usually, a belief that other members of society are harmed is the motivation behind outlawing or otherwise restricting an activity. The amount of harm would tend to increase with the activity level.

The rules of honor, when aided by the threat of violence against women tend to guide and restrict female behavior and become a means of social control. Women in societies where honor codes are dictated by men

\(^7\)A more in-depth survey of the theoretical literature can be found in, for instance, Eide, Aasness, and Skjerpen (1994).
Honor has come to mean that women can bring dishonor ... by simply conversing with a stranger, talking back to a father or brother, fleeing an abusive husband, criticizing in-laws, or failing to exhibit the submissive behavior expected within honor-bound societies (Hegland, 1992 and Lateef, 1992).

In response to the ideology of honor, families behave more harshly toward women than men. A man who steals, gambles family fortune or rapes suffers no serious consequences from the family. Moreover, in a rape situation, the man may escape harsh punishments while the women, who were victims of the violence, are treated more harshly. Recently, in Saudi Arabia, a woman who was raped was herself punished by the state. On the other hand, minor infractions by women may result in beatings that lead to death.

Honor-bound societies are not unique to Islamic, or Southern Mediterranean societies, similar honor-bound behavior can be found in the Andes, for example, where a man chooses with the blessings of society to beat a wife for challenging his dominant role (McKee, 1992). Honor-bound societies also exist in Southwest Asia, and among various Indian castes and Chinese elites as well as Latin American and Mediterranean peasant societies (Ortner, 1978). The concept of honor also appears in Western societies but under a transformation as noted in Baker et al., 1999. The United Nations Population Fund approximates that as many as 5,000 women are murdered under the name of ‘honor’ crimes worldwide each year⁸. ‘Honor’ crimes in the West usually focus on maintaining the sexual exclusiveness of the woman (Polk, 1997 and Wilson & Daly 1992).

Family honor that depends on the behavior of women within the immediate or extended family means that women themselves do not have a claim to honor as individuals but that their actions or perceived misbehavior can bring dishonor to the family. Thus, women are endowed with significant ‘negative power’ as their actions can discredit the whole family, clan or community (Block & Christakos, 1995, Deme, 1994, Wilson & Daly, 1992, Kandiyoti, 1987).

A rabbi of Yemeni descent and father of a young married girl who had an extramarital affair which she refused to end, killed his daughter after her husband repeatedly complained to others outside the family. Facing disapproval from his congregation for his seeming lack of control over his daughter’s behavior and following criticism for his lack of action, the rabbi strangled his daughter to death (Ginat, 1979).

One aspect of the crimes of ‘honor’ is the feeling of shame by family

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members. This feeling may arise when control over the female is threatened (Turner, 1995). In some societies, when a woman violates the honor code, killing her is viewed as an act of purification, cleansing or restoration of the family honor. The perpetrator wins the respect of the family and the community in general (Campbell, 1964). This may be the reason behind the fact that most ‘honor’ crimes in Jordan are committed by a relative of the victim, usually a brother. In some societies such as in Turkey, the perpetrator would sprinkle the blood of the victim on the weapon to show the community that he had restored family honor (Campbell, 1964). In much the same way, under Ottoman rule in the Arab world, the perpetrator would place some of the victim’s blood on his clothes to show he had cleansed his honor (Kressel, 1981).

Studies also show that public opinion measures highly in deciding whether to commit the crime or not. If the transgression remains unknown, the crime becomes less likely to be committed and matters are dealt with in a softer manner. In India, men restrict women’s movement to avoid the negative publicity (Kressel, 1981).

Many case studies suggest that the claim of honor is often mixed with social, economic, and political motives. Good reputation in the community is beneficial in all these aspects to the family. A dishonored female – and consequently – family would be less able to conduct its usual activities with the usual ease. Other siblings may not be able to marry because they are ‘shamed’. The head of household may not be able to find work as a ‘dishonored’ man. In India, honor, particularly among the ‘upper castes’, is vital for maintaining customer base, securing jobs, and finding employment opportunities for family members (Derne, 1994). In the Greek mountain communities, honor is associated with wealth and power (Campbell, 1964). Cleansing honor is like investing in the future of family wealth, a strategic future investment, and not simply maintenance (Kressel, 1981).

Therefore, one can surmise that ‘honor’ killings, whether in the north or south, are tools for the dominance of women. Such events may cross cultures, manifest in several forms, but the results are the same. They are not simply cultural but are aided by social and economic factors.

Models for the economics of crime generally utilize a supply-and-demand framework in which criminals supply crime, the public at large demands protection from crime, and the government provides public protection. The model can be used to show how crime responds to a variety of demographic, social and economic factors and what results to expect from public policy proposals (Zsolt, 1999).

The supply of crime is modeled as a choice between legitimate activities such as work on the one hand and criminal activities such as killing a
female for breaking the honor code of the community, on the other. The choice depends on the net payoff of the crime, which is the payoff of the criminal activity itself – which may include increased inheritance to the perpetrator, job gain and positive reputation within the community – above all other costs associated with the crime. These costs include the foregone wages from continuing legitimate activities such as work in current employment; the direct costs of the crime such as cost of gun, knife; elaborate criminal designs to commit the crime among other factors, and the expected future penalties from the crime (fines, incarceration, and other sanctions by the state of the community).

Note that other costs in societies that condone crimes of honor are not purely negative as noted earlier. Benefits from clearing the family name may outweigh losses, especially when the perpetrator is recognized as a male who has cleansed his honor and dealt with a wayward family relative in the proper and ‘manly’ manner while the punishment is not as severe as the crime itself or is generally considered ‘light’.

**Low/High Opportunity Costs**

Associated with the costs are expected foregone earnings or saved losses from not committing the crime as in the case of ‘honor’ crimes. In the case of ‘honor’ crimes, the higher the loss of business or employment opportunities within the community, the higher the cost of not committing the crime. The supply curve shifts to the right when the crime supplied by criminals for a given net return rises or when the return for a given level of activity falls.

A person has a low opportunity cost (very little to lose) from committing the crime if he/she ... loses little from being jailed or punished by the legal system ... Inversely, a person has a high opportunity cost if, by committing the crime, much is lost.

The supply of crime is positively related to the net payoff (benefits less costs) to criminal activities, which means that criminals will increase their activities when the net payoff rises. Therefore, the supply curve of the honor crime is positively sloped. Therefore, in societies where honor is viewed in relation to the acts of the woman within the extended family and where the community views the extra-marital sexual act of females as a crime to be punished, the supply curve of the crime shifts to the right. In societies where the community accepts extramarital sexual acts or is less likely to punish the offender or venerate the perpetrator, the supply curve does not shift significantly.

Examples of conditions that might cause a rightward shift of the supply curve include demographics such as a higher proportion of youth which is present in Jordan; high unemployment rates (currently unemployment in Jordan stands at 14%)\(^9\), fewer employment opportunities at a given

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\(^9\) See the various surveys and publications at www.dos.gov.jo
wage, and reduced punishment or imprisonment as in the case of Jordan as noted earlier. Education and welfare payments are also thought to increase the opportunity cost of committing crimes.

In highly educated societies and where adequate welfare payments exist, the crime is less likely to be produced, *ceteris paribus*. The slope of the supply curve is affected by whether the society is paternalistic or not. In societies where no punishment is handed out for committing ‘honor’ crimes and where the perpetrator is rewarded in terms of social standing and job opportunities or commercial relationships, the crime tends to have a higher propensity. In societies where there is purveyance of poverty, the benefits may allow for production at small net benefit level because of the need for pecuniary and social gains.

Education in ‘honor’ crimes plays a dual role: an educated perpetrator will conduct more elaborate schemes to commit the crime; at the same time he would be less likely to commit the crime if the benefits are relatively less, that is, if the loss of income is a strong possibility. In societies where education levels are high and employment opportunities are available, where there is a lower percentage of youth, where welfare benefits are adequate and where citizen welfare is high, the supply curve would have to be very steep and far to the left. Graph 1 shows a positively sloped supply curve of crime, which is easily adapted to the supply of ‘honor’ crimes in Jordan.

**Graph 1: Supply and Demand Curve**
The demand curve for ‘honor’ crimes is more complex than the supply curve. While it is also a combination of what the community and the individual demand, it relates to the net cost of the crime.

Societies that are paternalistic tend to endow the perpetrator of the crime with certain benefits. This endowment is viewed herein as the community effect in the demand curve: the higher the benefit perceived by the community, the less the net cost (cost less benefit). The higher the net perceived cost of the crime to society and the individual, the lower the quantity demanded of it.

The demand curve is, therefore, a culmination of the interaction of culture, societal perceptions, upbringing, psychological, and economic factors for the individual, as well as the community effect: societal perceptions of the crime, the level of demand to the crime as a positive deterrent of ‘wayward’ acts; the view that it is an accepted practice.

The father or brother who commits the crime against a daughter or sister sustains an emotional cost. In this diabolic calculation, the perpetrator must weigh the loss against the benefits he would receive from ‘saving his honor’.

Another factor that weighs into the calculation is the demand by the community for such crimes. Communities that condone such activities, promising prestige or status to the perpetrator decrease the cost of the crime at any level. These communities cause the demand curve to shift to the right, making the crime happen even when the cost to the perpetrator is high.

Therefore, communities that praise crimes of honor as a valid solution to the unwanted sexual conduct of females and thus believe that they are safeguarding the honor of the family or tribe, usually demand more quantities of the crime even though the net cost may be the same as in a society that appreciates the crime less.

In other words, in societies where reputation such as the honor of the family is placed above those of the acts of the individual, the demand curve would be dominated by the demand of the community, less so than the demand and net benefits/costs of the individual.

The model is also consistent with observed behavior in communities where the honor crime is less likely to happen if wayward behavior does not become public knowledge within the community; that is, if the community factor does not enter into the calculation of the criminal.
The Economic Underpinnings of Honor Crimes in Jordan

Information and Research Center, King Hussein Foundation

**Graph 2: The Impact of Government Regulations on the Supply and Demand of Honor Crimes**

The demand curve shifts to the left for any change to household conditions that decreases the payoff to crime for a given level or quantity of crime. Examples include reductions in material well-being or economic growth or the cost of increased in private vigilance over females. However, in societies where female participation in the labor force is low in general, as in the case of Jordan, the demand may be greater for ‘honor’ crimes since the female is viewed as a source of economic hardship, a dependent. Therefore, one possible means of reducing incidents of ‘honor’ crimes is to increase female participation in the labor force in general as this would shift the demand curve inward.

**The Government’s Role**

Government can directly cause both the demand and supply curves to shift by increasing the penalty of the crime. As legal penalties increase, the net cost rises at every level and the demand curve shifts inward to the left. Simultaneously, the supply curve also shifts to the left as the net benefit decreases at all levels of production.

Government can indirectly affect supply and demand by improving welfare to females through efficient social safety nets or better education.
and employment opportunities, thus making the female less of a financial burden upon the household. Additionally, campaigns aimed at changing the mindset of the community may help diminish the perceived benefits from the crime and thus decrease supply and demand.

It is important to note that even though the overall impact would be to decrease the incidence of the crime, individuals react differently to the crime based on their own supply and demand curves, and hence, some would continue to commit the crime in spite of government deterrence. One must keep in mind, however, that such a determination should not deter governments from increasing penalties for the crime or attempting to change the mindset of communities and individuals toward the social acceptability of the crime.

The intersection of demand and supply determines the equilibrium rate of crime and the equilibrium return to crime. By taking on a set of concrete measures, it is possible to move the equilibrium toward a lower level, decreasing the rate of ‘honor’ crimes (see Conclusion and Recommendations on page 58).

In other words, the government can act to reduce both the supply and demand for ‘honor’ crimes. Low conviction rates or ineffectual punishment decrease the net cost of the crime and increase the net benefit from the crime, ceteris paribus. Societal pressures affect both supply and demand, and hence the shift from a patriarchal paradigm could decrease the supply of the crime.

**Unemployment**

Unemployment is another important dimension in the economic and social life of individuals. According to the Department of Statistics Employment and Unemployment Report for 2009, the unemployment rates in Jordan have been at high levels since 2000. As Figure 1 indicates, the average unemployment rates in the last decade were around 14% (10% male and 28% females). The characteristics of the unemployed are as alarming as the high unemployment rate itself. The data from the Department of Statistics report for 2009 indicates a rise of unemployment rate between the university degree holders (Bachelor degrees and higher) by 19.6% compared with the other educational levels.

The data also reveals that male unemployment percentage of bachelor holders and higher was 21% and 55% for females. According to the report, the highest rate of unemployment was recorded among the 15–19 and 20–24 age group by 29% for both. The link between unemployment and criminal activity is important. Unemployment is strongly associated with crimes, drugs and other types of deviant behavior. The unemployed account for more than 40% of all violent crimes in 2008 (The Statistical Criminal Report, 2009, Public Security Department).
Poverty in Jordan

Poverty is measured in Jordan through the use of a poverty line, which comprises two budget components: for food and for non-food expenditures. According to the 2006 Household Income and Expenditure Survey (HIES), the Jordanian poverty line was JD46.3 per person per month (JD278 per month for a family of six, or JD3,336 per household per year).
Amman has the lowest poverty rate of all governorates but as the home of over 2 million people or one third of the population, it is also host to the largest number of poor.

The poverty line budget for food in 2006 was JD19.9 per person per month, calculated on the basis of estimated caloric requirements of 2340 calories per day (estimate based on the age, sex and activity level of the Jordanian population); and an average cost of JD0.28 to purchase 1,000 calories. The budget for other expenditures was set at the amount spent on non-food expenditures by Jordanians whose food budget was exactly at the poverty line food budget. On this basis, the poverty line for non-food budget was JD26.4 per person per month. Adding the two expenditure components brings the poverty line to JD46.3 per person per month in 2006.

In 2006, 13% of the population was below the poverty line with the highest rate of poverty observed in the Mafraq governorate. Amman has the lowest poverty rate of all governorates but as the home of over 2 million people or one third of the population, it is also host to the largest number of poor. Thus, while only 9.4% of the population that lived in Amman in 2006 was living below the poverty line, their percentage of the poor at the national level was 28%. Some sub-districts, including Rwaished, Wadi Araba and Aghwar Janoubiyah suffer extremely high rates of poverty.

**Figure 3: Poverty Incidence by Governorate in 2006**
Figure 4 shows the distribution of the poor in percentages in Jordanian governorates. These percentages show that Amman and Zarqa have 45% of the poor in Jordan. Governorates that are far less populated such as Mafraq which has the highest poverty incidence rate in Jordan is home to only 8% of the poor or 23% of its population.

**Figure 4:** Share of poor Jordanians living in each governorate 2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Governorate</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amman</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zarqa</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mafraq</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jerash</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ajloun</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balqa</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madaba</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karak</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tafilah</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aqaba</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maan</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irbid</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aqaba</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jerash</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mafraq</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is immediately apparent that poverty is not evenly spread within the Kingdom as poverty rates are highest in Mafraq, Karak and Tafilah, respectively, and lowest in Amman, Madaba and Irbid. Furthermore, 19% of the rural population is poor, compared to 12% of the urban population; thus, poverty rates are higher in rural areas than in urban areas. However, since the Jordanian population is largely concentrated in urban areas, three-quarters of all poor Jordanians live in urban areas.

In addition, as shown in Figure 5, many Jordanians who consume just above or below the poverty line are close to the line, indicating that poverty in Jordan is shallow. Thus, people may move in and out of poverty (as defined by the poverty line) at the slightest change of income. Furthermore, those classified as poor could be unclassified as poor as their incomes change slightly; thus, many move in and out of poverty.
poverty, a fact that allows for the high vulnerability of the poor to price changes and income fluctuations. Had the poverty line been set slightly higher to, say, JD50 per person per month, the poverty rate in 2006 would have been 16.6%.

**Figure 5:** A large part of the population is just above the poverty line.

In all cases, the use of a poverty line is an inadequate proxy for estimating the number or percentage of the poor in Jordan. Does a household of six people whose aggregate income exceeds the poverty line (JD3,336 per annum) by JD10 become not poor? Obviously not; however, for lack of a better definition, the poverty line, imperfect as it may be, has been used as an indicator of poverty in Jordan.

Furthermore, according to a study by the World Bank (March 2009), the following observations are noted:

- Poor adults have significantly lower earning potential than non-poor adults; 52% of poor adults have less than basic education, compared with a third (34%) of non-poor adults.

- Annual earnings per employed person, as a result of lower education attainments, are lower (JD2,266) among the poor than (JD3,352) among the non-poor.

- Poor persons are less likely to be employed than the non-poor. Only 26% of poor adults have jobs while 36% of non-poor adults do. The poor have a higher rate of dropping out of the labor force.

- Poor households have a higher number of dependent persons to be supported by each adult. The ratio of children to adults in poor households is 0.9 compared to 0.6 in non-poor households, which means that there is nearly one child for every adult in poor households, but much less than that in non-poor households.

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Based on the analysis of poverty in the previous sections and the World Bank study, one can describe the basic indicators of poverty in Jordan as: a low educational level of achievement, living in a high poverty incidence area, less likely to be employed, having a larger household size and consequently a larger number of dependents than the non-poor. Given that approximately 30% of the population consume at levels that approximate the poverty line, for the purposes of defining the poor in Jordan we use 30% as the percentage of the Jordanian poor instead of the official figure of 13% which has many deficits as noted in the cited World Bank study.  

Research Methodology

To conduct the necessary analysis to form a comprehensive picture on the issue, the profiles of both perpetrators and victims were collected. The interviews focused on the perpetrators, their perception of the dilemma as posed by the crime, the factors conducive to committing the crime, and the role of the cultural, social and economic context in which the perpetrators live. The interviews sought to look into the social, economic and cultural background of perpetrators of ‘honor’ killings as well as their victims.

The study depended on quantitative and qualitative research in order to obtain verifiable data and information relating to the crimes of killing women in the name of honor. The study covered ‘honor’ crimes in Jordan that are registered with official government stakeholders for the duration of 2000–2009, a total of 102 crimes. We obtained the data from a previous study conducted by the IRC utilizing official statistics and interviews with the perpetrators, families, and the victims themselves (survivors of the crime) for the years 2000 to 2003. The subsequent publication by UNIFEM in 2007 is entitled Female Killings in Jordan 2000 to 2003.

Data for the years 2004–2008 was obtained from the criminal records bureau, the Public Security Directorate (since no clear records were available for 2009) and interviews were conducted with 27 perpetrators, including four who committed their crimes in 2009.

Study and Sample Population

From March to August 2009, corrective and rehabilitation centers in Jordan hosted 43 perpetrators of ‘honor’ killings, or individuals who intended to engage in such practices. However, not all of these agreed to participate in the study so the sample was limited to 27 perpetrators who reside in the various corrective and rehabilitation centers within

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Note that the use of 30% rather than 13% makes the study methodology and findings more realistic. However, using the 13% as will be shown later would further support the findings of the study.
Jordan. The sample includes both males and females, all of whom have been convicted and sentenced. The crimes of 27 perpetrators of ‘honor’ killings, or individuals who were convicted of having attempted to commit ‘honor’ crimes took place between 2003 and 2009.

**Interviews**

In order to conduct the study and obtain the necessary details, the Public Security Directorate was contacted in order to gain access to the administrations of correctional and reform centers to allow the researchers to conduct interviews with convicted and arrested inmates for crimes related to ‘honor’.

We addressed the Criminal Information Administration in order to arrive at the whole set of numbers of perpetrators of ‘honor’ crimes in Jordan. We received permission to meet with the director of the Center for Rehabilitation and Reform on February 25, 2009.

Of the 43 inmates in Jordan’s various reform and rehabilitation centers, 12 refused to be interviewed. Others were later released or moved to other prisons. Of the remaining 27 who were interviewed, seven were accused of killing men in honor-related issues.

The interviews included filling out a questionnaire and answering open-ended questions relating to both the victim and the perpetrator. Questions were asked again, explained or addressed indirectly in order to ensure accuracy of information.

**Hindrances**

It is important to note that the field research was not without several hindrances, which were:

- Lack of privacy when conducting the interviews.
- The interviewees’ fear of speaking freely due to the presence of officers and the interference of official government observers.
- On several occasions, the researchers were repeatedly alerted by security observers not to delve into personal information.
- Some inmates had been removed from centers that had been previously visited and the researchers could not locate or interview them as a result.

**General Profiles of Victims and Perpetrators**

A general profile of the perpetrator shows him to be male, the victim’s brother, Muslim, his age ranging between 19 and 30, his education rarely above high school level, more likely to be illiterate or semi-literate than university educated, living in a high population density area, working in trade or as a driver, mostly married but quite often single.

In the case of the victim, her profile shows her to be a female between the ages of 19 and 30, Muslim, having completed high school, but far
more likely to be illiterate or semi-literate than university educated, unemployed and at home, single or married, but quite often divorced, and like her assailant brother, living in a high population density area. The age groups of both victims and perpetrators are within the range generally identified in demographic terms as youth. The combinations of a poor education, a low income for the perpetrator and a lack of a life outside the home for the victim are indicators of less than optimum living conditions. The high density living conditions and the presumed lack of privacy in which both perpetrator and victim find themselves add to the unfavorable conditions.

Our Findings
Based upon the research methodology outlined in the preceding section, the following results have been obtained. Although 102 ‘honor’ crimes were committed from January 2000 to February 2009, 11 victims were males, while the remaining 90% were females, the focus of our study. Furthermore, 98% of the female victims were Jordanian; the remaining 2% were other Arabs.

As shown in Figure 6, the number of ‘honor’ crimes committed against women during the period 2000 to 2009 was 91. The highest incidence of these crimes occurred in 2008 while the lowest was in 2000. Moreover, during 2003 to 2006, the number of crimes was falling and started to rise again as the economy growth rates began to decline. In 2009, only four crimes according to official records had been committed by February 2009, the time the data collection stage was concluded.

We had to rely on official figures in the study. However, a disparity exists between official and actual figures (Husseini, R. 2009) who reported that five ‘honor’ crimes against females were reported in the press, not four, during the data collection stage of the study. The year 2009 (January to September) witnessed 15 ‘honor’ crimes against women, which we included in the Figure 6. However, only four of these murders were covered in our subsequent analysis. (Continued on page 48)

Figure 6: Number of Crimes and Economic Growth (2000–2009)
A Digest of the Interviews

Questions posed to the interviewees included details on age, sex, place of residence, profession, economic status, marital status and educational level. A second set of questions related to the relationship between victims and perpetrators, the number of family members and general details on these. A further set of questions centered on details of the crimes, the background and subsequent events after the crime took place. Questions on the feelings of the perpetrator both before and after the crime, and the social, economic, physical and psychological factors that motivated them to commit such crimes were also posed.

Pride and Tradition

In the interviews, most perpetrators blamed the victims for the crimes committed by them. Excerpts from the interviews with the perpetrators reveal a self-perceived sense of ‘affront’ and ‘provocation’. According to some perpetrators, they were confronted by outspoken female relatives whose provocation was in the form of self-defense over their chosen social behavior. From the description of the perpetrator, the female relative’s act of provocation may have consisted of verbal rejection of interference in her life. In the perpetrators’ view, their acts were committed purely in defense of the honor and reputation of the family. Heated arguments between victims and perpetrators which often include a victim’s refusal to acquiesce to her male relative’s control, often end up in a frenzied killing, according to the results of the interviews.

Where some girls chose to run away, perpetrators have described an obsessive hunt for them. When finally located, the force of anger unleashed on the victim is described in terms of blind rage, a lack of conscious control.

The decision to kill is not always conducted in a blind rage, however. For some perpetrators, the decision is more calculated and factors in the various conditions of the rest of the family. A perpetrator described how no one in the family knew of his intention to commit the crime until he was in prison. The family’s reaction, however, is rarely that of shock. Family members lift charges, express sorrow but also an understanding and mothers often forgive. Other family members are aware of the intention to kill but do little to prevent it because of overwhelming social and family pressure over its perceived desirability.

Other perpetrators describe a slower approach, hoping that sense and conviction will win the victim over. They describe a sustained attempt to ‘change the behavior’ of the victim.

Perpetrators were also asked about the factors that drove them to commit these crimes. In most cases, traditions, dignity, society and honor were cited. While most expressed no feelings of regret or guilt, a few were able to articulate some sorrow at the loss of the victim.
Religion
Many perpetrators emphasized that religion was not a motivation. Out of 27 perpetrators who consented to the interviews, 23 asserted that their actions did not respond to the teachings of religion. Tribal, and not religious reasons, were emphatically cited by the majority of perpetrators. Instead, there is overwhelming emphasis from the perpetrators on the need to placate social, cultural and tribal pressures.

Female Perpetrators
‘Honor’ killings can be strongly entrenched in the mentality of females as well. Sometimes it is the women who commit crimes to save the family honor. Having killing her out-of-wedlock, newborn grandchild in a secret home birth, a female perpetrator conveys her reasons: “I was terrified. If her father and brothers learned what happened they would have killed her and me. Honor is the most important thing in our family.”

Families
Families of victims often drop charges against perpetrators. Despite the expression of the negative effects of imprisonment on the families, their young children and ailing parents, their support for the perpetrator continues in the form of visitations in prison. In the cases of attempted murders, victims themselves often drop the charges. Social ramifications of imprisonment in the case of male perpetrators often take the form of financial impoverishment but social effects such as diminished family care and low morale are also in evidence in the interviews.

Religion, Pride and Inevitability
An outstanding feature of the interviews is the revelation that religion was not a major motivating factor in the crimes. Instead, the interviews clearly reveal an overriding fear of repercussions from male members of the extended and immediate family as well as concern with society’s judgment on the family, and with reputation and pride superseding other feelings. The weight of such social and cultural demands and the heavy load of responsibilities that these demands have on the consciousness of those interviewed stand out quite starkly.

In areas where people live in close quarters and where privacy is often not available, the fear of social admonishment on the family is a painful and undesirable option. Furthermore, the discomfort of the perpetrators and their families at the prospect of being in close contact with offending partners is revealing. One perpetrator’s expression of his brother’s discomfort of having to go to the same class as the offending partner (presumably of the victim) is one such example.

The expression of the inevitability of murder or intent to murder is often cited among perpetrators. The perceived lack of options in addressing unconventional behavior manifested by members of their families (the victims) is prevalent among the perpetrators and their relatives.
(Continued from page 45) Note the coincidence of the crime with economic stagnation in recent years, which goes to support the view that violence against women increases at times of economic hardship. Not only does the number of crimes increase with the worsening of the economic situation in Jordan, but so does the slope of the curve, implying a positive correlation between economic crimes and falling economic growth rates.

The Victims

Figure 7 shows the greatest incidence of crimes is against women below the age of 36; these represent 91% of the victim population. The largest sub-category was female victims between the ages of 19 and 24 which represented 41% of victims, followed by women who were 25 to 34 years of age, and in third place were women under the age of 18.

**Figure 7: Age of Victims**

Note that the group of under 24 years of age comprised 54% of all female victims considered as ‘youth’. Members of this group of victims are supported or dependent upon the family for livelihood and have not yet gained economic independence. According to a study of the World Bank (not published), the financial independence of youth in Jordan is delayed well into adulthood years, and therefore includes victims between 25 and 30 years of age. The resultant dependent group would be 80% of the female victim population.

**Figure 8: Education Level of Victims**
In terms of the victims’ education level, females with less than a high school diploma make up 62% of the victim population as shown in Figure 8. Those with diplomas and bachelor degrees comprise only 8% of the victim population. The indication that the level of education of a victim is inversely related to the incidence of the crime is apparent.

**Figure 9: Employment Status of Victims**

Employment of the victim also seems to weigh into whether the person is a victim or not. As shown in Figure 9, only 18% of female victims were gainfully employed while the remainder comprised students (7%), housewives (21%), and unemployed (54%), making up 82% of the female victim population. Note that unemployment among the victims is 54% while the national unemployment average for females in 2008 was 24.4%. The fact that the majority of the victims were unemployed is a significant indicator not only of their economic dependence on their families but of their social powerlessness.

**Figure 10: Income Distribution of Female Victims**

The total victim population is not in the high income groups. Figure 10 shows that in terms of income, the majority of female victims (58%) earn less than JD250 per month which is below the median income per worker, and 42% earn less than JD450 per month.
As to marital status, the majority (69%) of victims were either single (44%) or divorced (25%). This indicates that the incidence of crimes is primarily against unmarried women and committed by someone other than the husband.

Figure 12 shows the distribution of the crime by region. The majority of the crimes were committed in the middle region of Jordan, which happens to have the highest number of poor in the country and suffers the greatest congestion. Interestingly, the middle or central region of Jordan is also the most industrialized and, consequently, where tribal relationships are weakest.

The indication, therefore, is that while tribal relations do matter, the incidence of poverty is more important in determining the regional distribution of the crime. Research into community impact on ‘honor’ crimes is warranted, but is beyond the scope of the current research.

**The Perpetrators**

The view that the majority of ‘honor’ crimes against women are committed by a person other than the husband is further supported by the data. The vast majority of crimes (76%) are conducted by a brother of the victim, possibly because the perpetrator has a low opportunity
cost (see definition of opportunity costs on page 34) as opposed to the father (13%) who as a family supporter would have a higher opportunity cost by committing the crime.

**Figure 13: Relationship of Perpetrator to Victim**

Only 11% of the crimes are committed by the husband (5%), son (2%), cousin (2%), sister (1%), and uncle (1%). The fact that brothers and fathers of victims are the majority of perpetrators (89%) indicates that the majority of the crimes are committed within the nuclear family, not the extended family, tribe or clan. However, this does not preclude the fact that clan, tribe, or community, do not exert pressure on the perpetrator whether directly or indirectly.

**Figure 14: Age Distribution of Perpetrators**
The finding that brothers of victims are the most likely perpetrators of the crime against women and our reference to the possibility that the choice of the perpetrator may be affected by the assumption that the brother has a lower opportunity cost from committing the crime is further supported by the fact that the majority of perpetrators are youth (64% of perpetrators are below 30 years of age). However, there is also more than a fourth of perpetrators who are over 30 years old which indicates that for some people the high cost of the crime might still be worth it.

As shown in Figure 14, 42% of perpetrators are under 24 years. The group of those between 19 and 24 years old are 34% of the population, which also happens to be the group that suffers the highest unemployment rate in the Kingdom.

**Figure 15: Education Level of Perpetrators**

The level of education of perpetrators of ‘honor’ crimes also indicates an inverse relationship between the level of education and the likelihood of committing the crime. According to the research, 92% of those who have committed crimes of ‘honor’ have no education beyond high school, and 71% have education levels that are below high school. Those with university degrees constitute only 2% of the perpetrators.

**Figure 16: Employment Level of Perpetrators**
Figure 16 shows that not only do perpetrators have low education achievement levels, they also suffer from a higher unemployment rate (16%) relative to the national average which hovered between 13% to 15% during the years the crimes were committed. About 33% of the perpetrator population was not working at the time of committing the crime, which is more than three times the national unemployment average for males (10.1%).

**Figure 17: Income Distribution of Perpetrators**

As shown in Figure 17, about 56% of the perpetrators’ income is less than JD450 per month, including 22% taking less than JD150 per month, and 17% ranging between JD215 and JD351 per month. It is important to note that it is difficult to formulate any meaningful analysis from the income data of the large number of missing cases. However, all other indicators (education, age, unemployment) reveal that most levels of income of perpetrators are of poor or near poor families.

**Figure 18: Marital Status of Perpetrators**
As for marital status, half of the perpetrators are married as shown in Figure 18. Given the high level of unemployment, low level of education and low incomes that characterize the perpetrators, the economic picture becomes even bleaker since they have to support others with their meager resources. In other words, the economic pressure upon them is much higher than the national average as they have to contend with fewer resources spent on more people.

**Figure 19: Regional Distribution of Perpetrators**

According to Figure 19, the perpetrators, the majority of them being brothers of victims, also reside in areas proximate to the victims. Hence, the majority of the perpetrators, just like the victims, reside in the middle region of Jordan, where poverty is highest.

**Conclusion to Victim and Perpetrator Analysis**

The preceding analysis indicates that the majority of victims and perpetrators reside within poverty areas and suffer from low levels of education, high unemployment rates, and low incomes. While the majority of women victims were single or divorced, half the perpetrators were married, which would have added further to their economic hardship. Given that most of the data was difficult to quantify, it was clear that the population suffered overwhelmingly from a lack of welfare indicators consistent with the previously reviewed literature and indicating a high correlation between poverty and ‘honor’ crimes. However, we take the analysis one step further.

In order to deal with the qualitative aspect of the data, we have used the methodology popularized by the advent of Fuzzy Sets developed by Lotfi Zadeh in 1965\(^{12}\) where, in the absence of accurate and specialized court data, the following heuristic rules have been adopted to determine

inclusion or lack thereof within the term ‘poor’. The person can be a full member (assigned a membership score of 1) or a partial member (assigned a score of less than 1) in the set.

Ideally, what is required is to determine if the person has a low opportunity cost (very little to lose) from committing the crime. Note that in the poverty section of this paper we indicated that the poverty line is not an accurate predictor of the number or percentage of the poor in Jordan, and that 30% of the population lies within close proximity of the poverty line and therefore can be considered to be poor. Therefore, using the poverty line as an indicator of poverty would not be appropriate in determining the set of poor persons within the population of the study (victims and perpetrators).

Instead, we will use logical rules to identify the poor in the population of the study. The use of logical heuristic rules enables the researchers to make determinations of those with a low opportunity cost for committing the crime. The rules are based on heuristic descriptors (young, mature, educated, employed, living in poverty area, etc); which, like the data provided by court records, are fuzzy. Such utilization of fuzzy set theory to deal with fuzzy data has been used in economics (see, for example, Mansur, 1995).

Table 1: Perpetrator, Victim…The ‘Poor’ Set

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>If Statement</th>
<th>Outcome of the Logical Rule</th>
<th>Membership in the set {Poor}</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Youth / Uneducated / Unemployed / Unwed / Living in High Poverty Area</td>
<td>Definitely Poor</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth / Uneducated / Unemployed / Living in High Poverty Area</td>
<td>Definitely Poor</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth / Uneducated / Living in High Poverty Area</td>
<td>Most Likely Poor</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth / Unemployed / Living in High Poverty Area</td>
<td>Most Likely Poor</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth / Uneducated</td>
<td>Likely to be Poor</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth / Unemployed</td>
<td>Likely to be Poor</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uneducated / Unemployed / Living in High Poverty Area</td>
<td>Most Likely Poor</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed / Uneducated</td>
<td>Likely to be Poor</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>Possibly Poor</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uneducated</td>
<td>Possibly Poor</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth</td>
<td>Possibly Poor</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Living in High Poverty Area</td>
<td>Possibly Poor</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The next step is to look within the data and classify it into those fitting within the logical rules and assign them memberships. The research team of the IRC conducted the assignment through discussions of each membership and assigned memberships in the ‘Poor’ set. Then the team tallied the percentage of perpetrators considered poor. Thus, using this methodology, we can bypass the fact that the data is fuzzy.

**Example:**

**Victim 1**  
Age 31, elementary education, not working, divorced, living in Irbid Industrial City  
Score: 1.0

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>If Statement</th>
<th>Heuristic description</th>
<th>Membership in the Poor set</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Youth / Uneducated / Unemployed / Unwed / Living in High Poverty Area</td>
<td>Poor</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Perpetrator 1**  
Age 37, no education, unemployed, married, living in Irbid Industrial City  
Score: 0.8

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>If Statement</th>
<th>Heuristic description</th>
<th>Membership in the Poor set</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not Youth / Uneducated / Unemployed / Living in High Poverty Area</td>
<td>Most Likely Poor</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Both the victim and perpetrator are included within the Poor set since their memberships in the Poor set is greater than 0.6, our cut-off or threshold for admitting an outcome into the set of Poor.

Based on this methodology, 71 of the 102 victims are classified as poor and 64 of the 102 perpetrators are classified as poor. Therefore, 70% of the victims are poor and 63% of the perpetrators are poor.

Given that the number of poor in Jordan is predicted at 30% as asserted earlier, the fact that 70% of the victims are poor shows a strong indicator that such crimes are most likely to occur within poor populations where education levels, employment and incomes are low. In other words, had poverty been neutral in its impact upon the so-called crimes of honor, the percentage of the poor would have been 30%. Our results indicate that poverty is not neutral and has a strong influence in determining whether the crime will occur or not.
Table 2 identifies the poor as comprising less than a fifth of the population. However, the poverty line that separates social groups is like a line in the sand because one extra JD could shift someone above or below the poverty line.

What distinguishes this group from the poor is that their members are working but barely meeting their basic needs. Above the vulnerable group there is the low level income group which is in a better situation than the group below it but has limited resources.

The mitigating factor for the poor is based on family care, charity and welfare unlike the vulnerable and the low income groups who depend on the income that they are earning from work. Socially speaking, the family remains central to the individual, creating a sense of solidarity that extends beyond economy and increases the dependence of poor people on the group factor on all aspects including their worth in the community.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

There is strong evidence that so-called crimes of honor are related to poverty; therefore, one can conclude that the poor are more likely to commit such crimes. At the very least, poverty can be determined as a non-neutral factor in ‘honor’ crimes.

The supply and demand model of ‘honor’ crimes and analysis developed in this research strongly suggest that the impact of community culture on such crimes is prevalent in Jordan, and that the government has a significant role to play in reducing these crimes. The government should strive to do the following in order to reduce the crimes:

- Empower women and improve their welfare by facilitating higher education attainments and by greater participation in the labor force through job creation or encouragement of entrepreneurship among females.
- Create greater awareness of women’s rights so that women become legally empowered to act in their own defense.
- Encourage a sense of honor as one that is determined by one’s own acts and not those of the group within the nuclear or extended family, clan or tribe.
- Conduct government sponsored media campaigns; public addresses by highly regarded individuals could shift the taste away from the crime and thus reduce the demand for it.
- Facilitate inclusive conversations and dialogue through general media outlets, which continuously address ‘honor’ crimes issues and their adverse impact on the victim, perpetrator, the immediate family, community, and society, would be vital in decreasing the crime rate, and in shifting the culture of the crime from being desirable as a duty of the male to becoming socially repulsive and criminal.
- Increase the likelihood of being caught for committing an honor crime. This is usually done through public awareness campaigns directed at households and society at large to report the crime.
- Increase the cost of committing the crime by repealing the relevant Articles 340, 98, 99, and 100 of the Penal Code.
- Improve social safety nets and the welfare of the public at large. This lends to viewing the female relative as less of a burden and counters some benefits from demanding the crime. In turn, this affects the public component of the demand curve of the crime and reduces it.
- Improve shelter conditions to potential victims and quick response alerts to reduce the likelihood of the crime being committed.
Continue the significant role of NGOs by encouraging independent research on the topic, keeping the ‘conversation’ inclusive, wide-reaching and sustainable. NGOs should also continue their lobbying efforts to ensure that the issue of ‘honor’ crimes is viewed widely as crimes of poverty, not honor.
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